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FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF EXCHANGES IN
PARTITION OF COMMONLY OWNED PROPERTY:
REALIZATION VS. REALISM
JONATHAN D. KANEY JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Partition of property between common owners is a nontaxable
event under a settled rule of federal income taxation.' Although
this rule is widely known and frequently applied, the reason under-
lying the rule is neither well understood nor often discussed. This
article analyzes authorities in this area for the purpose of discern-
ing the latent reason underlying the rule and educing principles of
general significance. The thesis of this analysis is that the cases can
be explained by the fundamental statutory doctrine that gain from
dealing in property is not included in gross income until it is real-
ized. The realization doctrine explains the partition cases, and in
their turn, the cases elucidate the doctrine.
The Tax Court has suggested conflicting reasons for the rule
that divisions of jointly owned property are nontaxable. On the one
hand, it has stated that the division of commonly owned property
is not a sale or exchange. On the other hand, it has stated that the
division is a nonrecognition exchange.3 Uncertainty concerning the
reason for the rule creates practical difficulties for taxpayers who
must predict tax consequences in analogous cases without benefit
of the underlying rationale. If the reason for the rule can be clari-
fied, the scope of the rule and the general principles which govern
its application will be better understood.
The reason for the rule that divisions of jointly owned property
are nontaxable is examined in Part I and implications of the rule
when rationalized by the realization doctrine are explored in Part
II.
LL.M. (taxation) 1979, University of Florida; J.D. 1969, Florida State University Col-
lege of Law. Member of The Florida Bar. Mr. Kaney practices law in Daytona Beach, Flor-
ida, with the law firm of Cobb & Cole, P.A.
1. See Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215 (1968); United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65
(1962).
2. Gerlach v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 156, 171 (1970).
3. Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 963 (1975), affd, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977).
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PART I
A. Preliminary Consideration of the Problem
Nontaxable divisions of property4 among co-owners take one of
two forms. A single item, or several fungible items of property,
may be divided into two proportional parts or groups, one of which
is set apart to each of the joint owners. This article will refer to
such a division as a simple partition.5 On the other hand,'n aggre-
gate of nonfungible items may be divided into distinct aggregates
of proportional value, one of which is set apart to each joint owner.
This form will be referred to as a complex partition. The simple
partition cleaves a single item, but the complex partition divides
an aggregate. The salient features of each partition can be illus-
trated by the following example.
Example
Assume that two parties, Adam and Nobel, are joint owners of
two different items of property as follows:
Description Adjusted Basis Fair Market
Value
Blackacre (1,000 acres $ 50,000 $100,000
of raw land)
1,000 shares of X Corp. $ 10,000 $100,000
common stock
The properties are capital assets held for investment for more
than one year. To effect an equal division in kind, Adam and
Nobel can use one of two divisions:
Simple Partition. The parties divide each asset proportionately,
each receiving 500 shares of stock and 500 contiguous acres of
Blackacre having a value of $50,000. To effect this division, Adam
executes and delivers a deed to Nobel conveying all his interest in
one parcel of 500 acres to Nobel. Nobel, in like manner, conveys
his interest in the other parcel to Adam. Also, Adam and Nobel
exchange stock assignments transferring 500 shares of X Corp.
stock to the other whereupon the joint certificate is surrendered
and separate certificates evidencing ownership of 500 shares by
each are issued by X Corp.
4. This article deals with divisions of any form of commonly owned property which may
be recognized as jointly or commonly owned under the principles of United States v. Davis,
370 U.S. 65 (1962). Neither the term joint property, nor other terms referring to co-owner-
ship, are used in any special common law significance unless the context so indicates.
5. Partition is not used in its common law sense in this article, but is used to refer
generally to the process of dividing property in kind among co-owners.
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Complex Partition. The parties divide the assets disproportion-
ately, but equally in value. Adam takes all of Blackacre, and
Nobel takes all shares of X Corp. stock. To effect this division,
Adam executes and delivers to Nobel an assignment transferring
all of his interest in the 1,000 shares of X Corp. stock to Nobel. In
return, Nobel executes and delivers to Adam a deed conveying all
of Nobel's interest in Blackacre to Adam.
The question is whether or not either partition is a taxable
event. The simple partition of X Corp. stock is a nontaxable divi-
sion on the authority of Revenue Ruling 56-437. With respect to
the simple partition of Blackacre, although no case directly on
point has been discovered, most authorities assume that the princi-
ple of Revenue Ruling 56-437 applies, so that the simple partition
of Blackacre also is nontaxable. In general, then, simple partitions
are nontaxable divisions. On the other hand, the complex partition
may be either a nontaxable division or a taxable exchange, depend-
ing on other factors.
Community property is one factor which must be taken into ac-
count. If the parties to the complex partition are a divorcing
couple residing in a community property state, and if Blackacre
and X Corp. stock are community property, then the division is
nontaxable under the rule of Walz v. Commissioner8 In cases not
covered by the Walz rule, however, plain reason indicates that the
complex partition is a taxable exchange.
Revenue Ruling 79-44 is the only direct authority to have held
reciprocal exchanges in partition of commonly owned property to
be a taxable event.9 There, two unrelated persons who were ten-
ants in common in two separate parcels of land, "rearranged their
interests so that each owned 100 percent of a separate parcel." 10
The ruling holds that the transfers which converted this jointly
owned property into separately owned parcels amount to an ex-
change to which section 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the
Code) applies. The holding makes clear that when common owners
of two or more distinct items of property effect a complex parti-
6. 1956-2 C.B. 507 (partition of jointly owned shares of stock represented by one certifi-
cate into separately owned shares represented by two certificates).
7. See, e.g., Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a Pro-
posal, 50 WASH. L. REV. 231 (1975).
8. 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). The Walz rule has been extended to certain common law mari-
tal property divisions involving joint property. See text accompanying notes 61-102 infra.
9. 1979-1 C.B. 265. See Rev. Rul. 69-486, 1969-2 C.B. 159.
10. 1979-1 C.B. at 265.
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tion, the trading of interests is a taxable event. Despite the obvi-
ousness of the principle applied by this ruling, however, the com-
plex partition will be a nontaxable division of property between co-
owners under the circumstances to which Walz applies.
To identify and rationalize the precise factors which serve to dis-
tinguish nontaxable partitions under Walz and Revenue Ruling 56-
437 from their taxable counterparts exemplified by Revenue Rul-
ing 79-44 will be the major undertaking of this article. The analysis
is little advanced by Walz or Revenue Ruling 56-437, for neither
offers cogent discussion of the reasoning upon which the result is
based. The ruling states that "there was no sale or exchange and
the taxpayers neither realized a taxable gain nor sustained a de-
ductible loss."" Walz includes a similar comment: "Here there has
been no sale or exchange of the property in question, but a division
of property. 1 2
From these statements, it appears that both authorities turn on
whether the transaction was a sale or exchange. s Although a parti-
tion is obviously not a sale, it is quite difficult to understand why a
partition, especially a complex partition such as was described
above in the example, is not an exchange. In the complex partition,
Adam and Nobel have traded their respective individual interests
in those assets set apart to the other. Are these not reciprocal
transfers of property? Of course these are exchanges; Revenue Rul-
ing 79-44 makes this clear.
Even the simple partition, although generally regarded as non-
taxable, poses the same analytical difficulty, because reciprocal
transfers of property also are necessary to effect the simple divi-
sion. In the simple partition of X Corp. stock, Adam and Nobel
reciprocally transfer the undivided interest of each in those shares
set apart to the other. The same reciprocal transfers are seen in
the exchange of conveyances which separate Blackacre into sepa-
rate parcels. Therefore, even the simple partition is an exchange,
and the reason it is nontaxable is no less obscure than the reason
the complex partition is nontaxable."'
11. 1956-2 C.B. at 507.
12. 32 B.T.A. at 720.
13. A sale is the conversion of property into money, Ray v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 438,
441 (1952), afl'd, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954), whereas an
exchange is a reciprocal transfer of property for property, Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(d) (1957).
14. In the example set forth in the text, the simple partitions appear to qualify for non-
recognition under I.R.C. § 1036(a), which would apply to the exchanges in partition of stock,
and I.R.C. § 1031(a), which would apply to the exchanges in partition of Blackacre, provided
the property is to be held for investment or use in business. In fact, however, if no gain is
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Despite the fact that "exchanges easily recognized by the tax
lawyer are taking place, 1 5 however, in the cases examined in this
study the courts have consistently applied and expanded the Walz
rule without clarifying the reason for nontaxability. Consequently,
the rule expressed in Walz has come to be regarded as a rule with-
out a reason, a rootless judicial amnesty from taxation. 16 Among
those who have considered the question, the Walz rule is almost
uniformly considered erroneous, and the error is either criticized
on doctrinal grounds or praised on policy grounds.1
7
The possibility that Walz and its progeny can be squared with
the Code has not been seriously entertained, but it is believed that
these cases can be explained as applications of the fundamental
principle that a gain is not taxed under the Code until it is real-
ized. A brief perspective on the realization element of gross income
is essential to this inquiry.
B. The Section 61(a)(3) Taxable Event:
Disposition and Realization
Under Code section 61(a)(3), gross income includes gains derived
from dealings in property.'6 Gross income arises when two distinct
elements concur, that is, when a disposition of property results in
realized, neither statute can apply. The Internal Revenue Service, in Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-
2 C.B. 507, could have applied § 1036(a) but did not. This point appears to have little
practical significance with respect to immediate or deferred consequences. The example,
however, can be infused with practical immediacy if it is assumed that, by prearrangement,
Adam will sell his parcel of Blackacre for cash of $10,000 plus a purchase money note paya-
ble over 10 years and will report gain on the sale pursuant to I.R.C. § 453. Adam would fail
to satisfy the "to be held" requirement of § 1031(a). See Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333.
Whether or not the exchange in partition is a nonrealization event determines, in practical
effect, whether Adam has immediate or deferred recognition of his gain. If the partition is
not taxable, gain is not realized until the sale, and § 453 will be effective to defer his gain.
The present analysis is concerned with realization, however, and this secondary question of
recognition is not of immediate concern.
15. J. FREELAND, S. LIND, & R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION
165 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FREELAND, LIND, & STEPHENS].
16. See Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), aff'd, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977).
17. See, e.g., FREELAND, LIND, & STEPHENS, supra note 15, at 165-66; Taylor & Schwartz,
Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements, 7 TAX L. REV. 19, 56 (1951).
18. Gross income arising under § 61(a)(3) is defined and measured by § 1001(a),(b).
Under some views of the statute, it is possible to understand § 1001(c) as the operative
statutory command to recognize gain from dealings in property. The view of the statute
followed in this article is that § 61(a)(3) includes in gross income gains from dealings in
property; that § 1001(a),(b) define and measure the gain; and that § 1001(c), somewhat re-
dundantly, directs that this gain, so defined and measured, shall be recognized unless the
Code provides an exception. See note 22 infra.
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realization of gain." A disposition is any transfer, including a sale
or exchange.2 0 Since a partition is effected by the exchange of
property, it involves dispositions by both parties, but if it does not
result in realized gain, section 61(a)(3) does not apply, and the par-
tition is properly held nontaxable. In ordinary usage, "to realize"
means to convert into money.2 1 The tax significance of the term is
broader but cognate. The realization doctrine holds that mere ap-
preciation in the value of property is not gross income. From this it
follows that realization involves change; it occurs upon the conver-
sion of property into money, other property, or other economic
benefit cognizable for tax purposes.
The key to the present analysis is the separation of the realiza-
tion element of gross income from the disposition element. Unfor-
tunately the cases and literature obscure the separateness of these
elements. More often than not, the disposition will result in the
taxable change of position, and the concurrent elements of the tax-
able event need not then be separated. The courts have long recog-
nized, however, that a taxable change of position does not necessa-
rily concur with every exchange.
The habit of speech which uses the couplet "sale or exchange" to
denote the section 61(a)(3) taxable event blurs the distinct require-
ment of realization and obscures the fact that not every exchange
is a taxable event." Use of the couplet to denote the section
61(a)(3) taxable event is not conducive to precise communication
in two respects. It wrongly implies that dispositions other than
sales or exchanges are not taxable, 8 and it wrongly implies that all
19. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Estate of Levine, [1979] TAX COURT RPTR.
(CCH) No. 68 at 3707 (Aug. 6, 1979).
20. See, e.g., Estate of Herbert v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. de-
nied, 322 U.S. 752 (1944).
21. WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICrIONARY 1182 (1978).
22. The use of the phrase "sale or exchange" to denote the § 61(a)(3) taxable event no
doubt derives from I.R.C. § 1001(c) which provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this
subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or
exchange of property shall be recognized." This subsection is preceded by two subsections
which employ the broader "sale or other disposition." Whereas the broader term appears in
subsections dealing with measurement of gain, the subsection using the narrower term deals
with the operative matter of recognition. Because it uses the narrower term, it might have
been supposed that the statute would not tax other dispositions; of course, this inference
never has been drawn. See Helvering v. Roth, 115 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1940). Section 1001(c)
never has been understood to narrow the tax base, but it has tended to force an awkward
usage at times. E.g., Walz, 32 B.T.A. at 720 ("no sale or exchange . . . but a division").
23. See, e.g., Estate of Herbert v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 745, 758 (3d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 752 (1944) ("[Tihe taxpayers argue that 'other disposition' is to be limited
in its meaning by the preceding word 'sale'. We do not think so."). See also United States v.
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exchanges are taxable.24 Dispositions are a broader category than
sales or exchanges and taxable events are a narrower category than
dispositions. When used to mean the section 61(a)(3) taxable
event, the couplet, by force of custom, is idiomatic. Nevertheless it
is an exocentric term of art identifying a concept which is larger
than the sum of its parts.
An equivocation can result when "sale or exchange" is used to
stand for the taxable event. From the premise, the term "sale or
exchange" means "taxable event," it is false to deduce that every
exchange is a taxable event. "Exchange" is used in one sense in the
premise and in another sense in the conclusion. This equivocation
may be responsible for much of the confusion in the partition
cases.
The rule that gains are not taxable until realized was developed
in cases applying the early income tax statutes.2 Early on it was
settled that mere growth in value was not income under the stat-
ute. The position of the government in Lynch v. Turrish was that:
"Mere appreciation of capital value does not produce 'income,'
... "26 The increase is taxable "at the moment of realization by
sale or some act of separation."'" A different approach, however,
was taken by the government in Eisner v. Macomber8 where an
unsuccessful, alternative argument was that a stock dividend could
be included in gross income as the measurement of income accru-
ing by virtue of capital appreciation of the stock. The Court held
that "enrichment through increase in value of capital investment is
General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); Interna-
tional Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943). Use of the couplet also
obscures the fact that not all dispositions are taxable events. Gifts generally exemplify dis-
positions which are not taxable events because no realization concurs with the disposition.
See Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); Rev. Rul. 73-183, 1973-1 C.B. 364
(passing of property to executor "does not constitute a taxable realization of income"); Rev.
Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 C.B. 223 (passing of property at death is a disposition from which gain
is not realized). But see Estate of Levine, [1979] TAx COURT Rpm. (CCH) No. 68 at 3707
(Aug. 6, 1979); Evangelista v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1057 (1979), aff'd, 80-2 U.S.T.C. V1 9607
(7th Cir. 1980).
24. See Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); Tress. Reg. § 1,1001-1(a) (1957).
25. See, e.g., Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242
(1924); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176
(1921); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920); Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918); Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918); Lynch
v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221 (1918).
26. 247 U.S. 221, 227 (1918).
27. Id.
28. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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not income in any proper meaning of the term. '2 9 Macomber based
its holding on both statutory and constitutional grounds; and al-
though its authority is suspect on the constitutional grounds,30
there is no doubt that the statutory meaning of gross income for
purposes of sections 61(a)(3) and 1001 includes only such gains as
have been realized.31
Macomber undertook to define gross income as something de-
rived from capital. This approach properly has been criticized as
being conceptually too rigid to provide a workable test in the
pragmatic field of income taxation.2 The courts no longer pursue
29. Id. at 214-15.
30. See Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
31. See generally R. MAGiLL, TAXARLE INcOmE 80 (1945) ("[Eisner v. Macomber) is still
a landmark in its holding that income must be realized, the minority of the Court were as
certain of this point as the majority."); S. SutREY & S. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON
521 (1955) [hereinafter cited as SutREY & WARREN] ("(Slection 61(a) 'gain' arises only when
a disposition occurs which is of such a nature that administrators, and ultimately courts,
will state that the disposition constitutes a realization of income .... "). See also Estate of
Levine, [19791 TAX COURT Rpm. (CCH) No. 68 at 3714 (Aug. 6, 1979) ("The question, how-
ever, is not whether a disposition occurred . .. but whether a gain was realized from such
disposition.") The court in Levine held that a donor realizes gain on disposition by gift of
property encumbered above its adjusted basis. In Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 179, 184
(1979), the court noted that "courts have consistently held that not every economic benefit
constitutes income .... An economic benefit is not usually considered income until it is
realized." (Citations omitted.)
32. It is interesting to speculate that the realization requirement announced in Ma-
comber sounded a discordant note because it was a closed concept and, as such, an anath-
ema to the pragmatic thinking which dominates federal income taxation. Realization
threatened to constrict the tax base as much because of its conceptualism as because of its
constitutional status. In 1941, Stanley S. Surrey pronounced the conceptual notion dead,
and redefined realization in starkly pragmatic terms:
If we interpret it correctly, Helvering v. Bruun [309 U.S. 451 (1940)] marks the
end of one era in our tax history. What had commenced as a highly conceptual
view of the realization of income has in the intervening twenty years become no
more than a recognition of an expedient procedure . . . . If increase in value of
property be conceded income in the economic sense the decision not to tax that
increase for one reason or another is simply a decision to base the income tax for
the time being on something less than a taxpayer's total income. When an event
occurs which legislators, and through them administrative officials, feel is suffi-
cient to end the postponement, a realization of income has occurred in the legal
sense,
Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent
Decisions, 35 ILL. L. Ray. 779, 783-84 (1941) (citation omitted).
Surrey's article has had profound influence on the manner in which realization is per-
ceived, but he overstated the case when he suggested that Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940), a case now understood as an assignment of income case, made an event of realization
out of a gift. See Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 C.B. 223. Similarly, his depiction of realization as
a formless expedient was overdrawn, as he, in effect, conceded in his textbook. SuRREY &
WARREN, supra note 31, at 521. Nevertheless, Surrey's views illustrate the vigorously prag-
matic state of mind in the field, and the resulting opprobrious connotation of realization, all
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this derivation approach. At the core of the Court's holding in Ma-
comber, however, is the relevant economic distinction between re-
alized gain and unrealized appreciation. The distinction is found in
the extent to which the distribution of a stock dividend effects a
change in the appreciated property. Macomber found the distribu-
tion of the stock dividend was not an event of realization because,
"it does not alter the pre-existing proportionate interest of any
stockholder or increase the intrinsic value of his holding or of the
aggregate holdings of the other stockholders as they stood
before."33 No taxable change of position had occurred. Macomber
is currently understood best in this light: "The Court was there
endeavoring to determine whether the distribution of a corporate
stock dividend constituted a realized gain to the shareholder, or
changed 'only the form, not the essence,' of his capital invest-
ment."' Between the realized gain on the one hand, and a change
of the form but not the essence of capital on the other, a line is
drawn by the realization doctrine.
Macomber did not concern reciprocal transfers, but in 1924,
Weiss v. Stearn defined the realization requirement as it applies to
exchanges." Stearn involved the application of the Revenue Act of
1916 to a corporate reorganization of an Ohio corporation. Pursu-
ant to the reorganization, a new Ohio corporation was organized;
all assets of the old corporation were transferred to the new corpo-
ration; and shareholders of the old corporation received stock of
the new corporation plus cash. The opinion states: "The owner of
each $100 of old stock thus received $150 cash, also $250 of new
stock representing an interest in the property and business half as
large as he had before." ' The collector viewed the transaction as
fully taxable, but the lower courts held, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that the taxpayer "really sold half [of his stock] for cash
and exchanged the remainder, without gain, for the same propor-
tionate interest in the transferred corporate assets and business. 3 7
The Court held this transaction to be a nontaxable exchange.
The analysis follows Macomber in identifying the event sought to
of which contribute to the desuetude of realization as a tool with which gross income ques-
tions are analyzed by bench and bar.
33. 252 U.S. at 211 (citing Town v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918)).
34. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955) (quoting Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 210 (1920)).
35. 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
36. Id. at 252.
37. Id.
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be taxed as one which did not create a taxable change of property.
The opinion by Justice McReynolds emphasized the essential
sameness of the interest of the taxpayer before and after the trans-
action. The Court held that it could not "conclude that mere
change. . in the technical ownership of an enterprise, under cir-
cumstances like those here disclosed, followed by issuance of new
certificates, constitutes gain separated from the original capital in-
terest [gain realized]. Something more is necessary-something
which gives the stockholder a thing really different from what he
theretofore had. '3 8
The Court quickly narrowed the reach of Stearn when it decided
Marr v. United States"9 in the following year. With Justice Bran-
deis writing for the majority, the Court found a taxable exchange
under the Revenue Act of 1916 in a reorganization of General Mo-
tors Company which shifted the state of incorporation from New
Jersey to Delaware and slightly altered the capital structure. On
the facts, the Court attributed taxable significance to the alteration
of rights which it inferred would result from the change of state of
incorporation, and from the adjustments in capital structure which
accompanied the change. Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, But-
ler, and McReynolds dissented, protesting that the taxpayer re-
ceived "nothing differing in substance from what he already
had.," 0
Despite the confinement it experienced in the corporate reorgan-
ization area, Stearn establishes the test of taxability of an ex-
change. 1 The taxpayer must receive something really different
38. Id. at 254 (citations omitted). The problem considered in Stearn long has been cov-
ered by explicit statutory provisions, and the case has little current significance in the reor-
ganization area. See I.R.C. § 354.
39. 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
40. Id. at 542.
41. See generally 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20.03 (1973).
In the words of Justice McReynolds, the taxpayer must receive "a thing really different
from what he theretofore had." 265 U.S. at 254. This idea is expressed in various terms in
other authorities. Judge Learned Hand used these words:
[Tihe question whether a profit ensues depends not so much upon whether one
chattel is exchanged for another as upon what are the rights of the taxpayer
before and after the transaction under consideration. If these be so far changed as
to constitute substantially a new means of command over money, there may be a
taxable transaction, in spite of the fact that appreciation in value in the same
property never alone results in profit.
Allen v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 655 (1931). Judge
Hand observed: "It is the change that counts. ... 49 F.2d at 719.
The same rule appears in the current regulations issued pursuant to § 1001 where it is
provided that "the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from
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from what he already had, different in substance and not merely in
form. This test is a part of the realization doctrine, because the
rule in Stearn, derived directly from Macomber, continues to be
effective today.2
The realization requirement as applied to exchanges has limited
practical significance. Under Marr the taxpayer readily can be
shown to have received a materially different interest in property.43
Most often this aspect of the realization doctrine is cited in cases
which hold that realization occurred. 4 The important point, how-
ever, is the principle that not every exchange is a "moment of real-
ization." This principle can be recognized only if the disposition
element of the taxable event is distinguished, for purposes of anal-
ysis, from the realization element. Upon this principle and upon
this distinction will rest the rationalization of the partition cases.
C. Division of Community Property
The partitions described in the example set forth above now can
be reconsidered. Simple partition yields readily to the analysis
which separates the disposition element from the realization ele-
ment. The parties to a simple partition do not receive property
the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or extent, is
treated as income or as loss sustained." Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1958) (emphasis added).
The point was treated more elaborately in an earlier edition of the regulation which pro-
vided, in pertinent part:
Gain or loss arising from the acquisition and subsequent disposition of property is
realized when as the result of a transaction between the owner and another person
the property is converted into cash or into property. . . that is essentially differ-
ent from the property disposed of. . . .In other words. . . a change in substance
and not merely in form ... is required to complete or close a transaction from
which income may be realized.
Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 1563, Revenue Act of 1918 (1920 ed.). See also Estate of Timken v.
Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 494, 501 (1942), aff'd, 141 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1944); Rev. Rul. 72-
265, 1972-1 C.B. 222, 223.
42. Tress. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1958). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-633, 1968-2 C.B. 329, 330
("The transaction effected a substantial change in her property interest. ... ) (citations
omitted).
43. In fact, the doctrine of realization as applied to corporate distributions and reorgani-
zations, and developed in opinions by Justice Pitney in Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339
(1918), United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921), and Rockefeller v. United States, 257
U.S. 176 (1921), had already established ample support for treating merely legal changes as
events of realization. In that respect, Steam stands alone among the early realization cases.
However, alone among the cases theretofore decided, Stearn involved an exchange, and is
more readily distinguished especially when it is recalled that the Court was, in 1925, still
concerned with the derivation of income from property.
44. See, e.g., Commercial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 1138 (1927). See also R.
MAGILL, supra note 31, at 77; cases cited in SURREY & WARREN, supra note 31, at 520-21.
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which is essentially different in kind or extent than that which
they transfer. In fact, where the stock of X Corp. is partitioned,
the property transferred is identical to the property received.
Stearn could hardly fit the facts of an exchange more neatly. The
simple partition of Revenue Ruling 56-437, therefore, can be un-
derstood as an exchange of property not resulting in realized gain.
Although the disposition is clear, no gain is realized because no
taxable change of property occurs.
Complex partition is the same, but the analysis is not as easily
demonstrated. A closer examination of Walz is needed. Walz con-
cerned the division of community property in the dissolution of a
Texas marriage. Under a separation agreement, the husband trans-
ferred his entire interest in certain depreciated stock to the wife as
a part of an equal value division of the community property in
which he received other assets of the community. The husband
claimed a loss on the stock, but the deficiency notice stated that
"'losses' resulting from the partition of community property or re-
sulting from a separation agreement do not constitute allowable
deductions."'" The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Commis-
sioner, stating: "Can it be said that when two or more parties are
the owners in common of a mixed aggregate of assets purchased for
profit and decide to partition it, a gain or loss results from such
partition? We think not.'" This result was not affected by the fact
that the division was disproportionate with respect to each item of
property. Although the wife received all of the stock, "[o]ther
property of an equivalent value was awarded to the husband."'"1
The best indication of the Board's reasoning is the statement
that, "when the one-half interest of the wife in the community
property was set apart to her in the separation agreement, she was
only receiving that which was hers already."' 8 This is tantamount
to holding that the separate requirement of realization is absent.
In effect, the Board says the taxpayer received nothing from the
exchange that she had not owned prior to the exchange, so that no
taxable change of property has occurred which would be an event
of realization. An echo of Steam, decided only ten years earlier,
can be heard in this decision. Justice McReynolds spoke of the
need to receive "a thing really different from what he theretofore
45. 32 B.T.A. at 719.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 720.
48. Id. at 719-20.
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had, '49 and Judge Black found that the wife merely received "that
which was hers already."50 Despite the failure of the Board in
Walz to cite authority connecting that case to the principle on
which it is decided, Walz is continuous with Stearn, and must be
understood to have turned on the finding that the exchange, be-
cause it did not result in a receipt of different property, was a non-
realization event to which the statute did not apply.5'
It is clear that Walz assumes that a single thing was divided, as
revealed by the syntax in the critical statement: "Can it be said
that when two or more parties are the owners in common of a
mixed aggregate of assets . . . and decide to partition it, a gain or
loss results from such partition? 5 2 The object of the infinitive "to
partition" is the singular pronoun "it," the antecedent of which is
the singular "aggregate," and not the plural "assets." Having
joined the mixed assets into a single thing, the Board, by simple
logic, reasons that gain is not to be realized when the taxpayer
merely separates his undivided interest in a single object of prop-
erty into a several interest in a distinct part of the property.
Although several assets were involved in the partition and the
transfers separating them can in no formal way be distinguished
from the transfers deemed to exist in Revenue Ruling 79-44, under
the Walz analysis, these several assets are one single thing, linked
together by some unarticulated syndetic. Revenue Ruling 79-44, on
the other hand, is distinguishable because the assets there involved
were not parts of a single thing for purposes of the realization anal-
ysis. Whatever syndetic force bound the Walz assets together was
not perceived in the facts of Revenue Ruling 79-44.
The syndetic is community property.53 The Board decided its
49. 265 U.S. at 254.
50. 32 B.T.A. at 720.
51. Simplified, Walz says that a partition of a single thing between its co-owners is non-
taxable. See PART I, section G. infra.
52. 32 B.T.A. at 719.
53. See Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213. In Private Letter Ruling 8016050 (Jan. 23,
1980), the Internal Revenue Service stated:
Rev. Rul. 76-83 stands for the proposition that an approximately equal division
of the total value of the community property that provides for the transfer of
some assets in their entirety to one spouse or the other is neither a sale nor an
exchange, but is a nontaxable division of the joint interests in the property. Rev.
Rul. 76-83 is based on the principle that the interest of each spouse in the com-
munity property is an interest in the property as an entity. A decree of partition
merely severs that interest. As a consequence the adjusted basis and the holding
period of the property received in the partition is the same as it was in the hands
of the community. (Emphasis added.)
The italicized portion of the above quotation is the first recorded instance in which the
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case on this factor, not merely that the parties were married, nor
merely that the parties owned several items in the same propor-
tions, but actually that the property was community property.
In the predominating view among the Tax Court judges, the
community estate has a singularity which is the root of the Walz
analysis, although the cases also recognize that the community
property interest inheres in each distinct item. The best articu-
lated review of Walz is found in C.C. Rouse v. Commissioner, in
which the Tax Court stated: "We concluded [in Walz] that there
was no sale or exchange of property, but merely a division.'"" Dis-
tinguishing the case sub judice, in which the husband acquired the
wife's community interest with a promissory note, the court stated:
If there were simply a division of the community estate... the
property would have been equally divided, or at least an attempt
would have been made in good faith to achieve an equal division.
In that event, where, in exchange for a vested undivided one-half
interest in the whole, each party receives a vested interest in the
whole of one-half, obviously there would be no resulting taxable
gain, and no change in the basis of any of the property by reason
of the settlement."5
The court used a collective, singular noun, "community estate," to
refer to what Watz called a "mixed aggregate of assets," and art-
fully phrased the essence of the nonrealization partition, as the ex-
change of a vested undivided one-half interest in the whole for a
vested interest in the whole of one-half. It is unfortunate that the
court felt that this exchange was so obviously nontaxable that cita-
tion showing the link to the realization doctrine is not made, but
these comments illuminate the Walz rule nonetheless."
Service has acknowledged that partitions of community property are partitions of a single
thing. Viewed in this light, the cases involve partitions which are nontaxable because no
gain is realized when the owners "merely sever" their interests. Such an approach to the
cases is consistent with the thesis of this article and inconsistent with the view that the
cases constitute a judicial nonrecognition rule limited to marital dissolution cases.
54. 6 T.C. 908, 914 (1946).
55. Id. at 913-14.
56. A similar view is expressed in Conner v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1043, 1045
(1975):
[E]ach spouse is entitled to one-half of each asset comprising the community es-
tate. Since it would be impracticable to distribute one-half of each asset to each
spouse, the community property may be divided in kind with each spouse receiv-
ing assets of approximately equal total value .... Each spouse thus receives
property equal to his one-half interest in the community. Since each spouse re-
ceives only what is already his, such an equal division of the community property
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References by the tax judges to the community as a singular ob-
ject seem to follow the view of community property state courts
and commentators. Their view is that while the interest of a spouse
in community property inheres in each asset, the interest also un-
deniably has a transcending character which inheres in the aggre-
gate as well.5 7 Thus, community property has a dual aspect. It is
not useful for purposes of this analysis to attempt to resolve the
competing explanations of community property, for none of the tax
cases under consideration have chosen to attach significance to nu-
ances among the states' community property laws. Community
property is treated as a solid concept by the courts of tax jurisdic-
tion which are concerned with the broad effect of these laws, not
with their subtleties.5
The essential feature of community property upon which the
rule of Walz is bottomed is that, insofar as relevent to the analysis
of the tax consequences, the community estate is a single asset
composed of separate units. It is polychotomous but singular.5 9 It
is not a taxable event.
The final sentence drives home the latent principle of nonrealization.
57. Compare Hjorth, supra note 7, at 240-41 and Schwartz, Divorce and Taxes: New
Aspects of the Davis Denouement, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 176, 196-97 (1967) with Taylor &
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 56 and Hull, The New Uniform Divorce Laws: The Davis Deci-
sion, in NEw YORK UNIVERSITY THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1
36.05 (1979). Support can be found both for the view that each spouse has a separate inter-
est in each asset, and for the view that the interests of the spouses inhere in the aggregate.
The latter view is the appropriate view for tax purposes. Hjorth, supra at 240-41. See
Mortensen v. Knight, 305 P.2d 463 (Ariz. 1956); In re Chavez's Estate, 280 P. 241 (N.M.
1929) (Bickley, J., dissenting) for comparisons of the community with a partnership. But cf.
Crosby v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 323, 327 (1942), vacated and remanded per curiam, 43-2
U.S.T.C. 9588 (9th Cir. 1943) ("A marital community can not soundly be viewed as so
completely a partnership as to require application of the Federal statutes as to income tax
....1').
58. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213 ("In community property states a division
of community property incident to a divorce. . . is not considered a taxable event to either
spouse when there is an equal division of the fair market value of the community property
with some of the assets going in their entirety to one spouse and some going in their entirety
to the other.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For purposes of the present study, the
salient aspect of community property is its aggregate characteristic. During coverture, prop-
erty acquires and loses its community status because of the status of the parties. If an item
is disposed of, its proceeds are nevertheless community property, as will be the item ac-
quired therewith. There is an interest in each item, but not a severable interest. Upon disso-
lution of the marriage, the interest in each item is merged in the whole, for it is the general
rule that complex partition is the usual form of division. See Hjorth, supra note 7, at 240-41
n.43.
59. Thomsen v. Thomsen, 159 P. 1054 (Cal. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1916) expresses the notion
upon which Walz and its progeny apply the nonrealization principle derived from Steam to
community property divisions. Thomsen vividly depicts the so-called "aggregate" theory of
community property which holds that the spouses' rights inhere in the aggregate of the
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is now well settled that complex partition of community property
community property and not in each item of property.
In adjusting the property rights of the parties the court may consider all the com-
mon property as one asset or fund, composed of separate units, and can often
more equitably settle and adjust matters by giving all of designated and described
pieces of property to one party than by awarding to each an undivided interest in
all .... The court is no more bound to award to each spouse an undivided inter-
est in each piece of land than it is to award to each an undivided interest in each
cow or horse.
Id. at 1056.
The aggregate theory contrasts with the "item" theory which holds that the spouses have
specific undivided interests in each discrete item of property The extent to which any com-
munity property state bases the legal rights of the spouses on either theory is unclear, for
cases which would develop these principles usually deal, not with a choice between theories,
but with a concrete issue the resolution of which may be more or less harmonious with one
theory or the other. Hjorth, supra note 7, at 240-41 n.43 notes:
In an "item theory" community property state [treating a complex partition of
community property as a taxable event] would be theoretically correct. Before dis-
solution each spouse has an undivided one-half interest in each asset owned by
the community. This undivided interest in all assets is exchanged for a complete
interest in some assets. Thus there is a [taxable event] . . .. It is doubtful, how-
ever, whether any community property state adheres strictly to the "item theory."
In the divorce context, the item theory seems to be limited to the rule that items
of property not specifically allocated to one spouse or the other will be held by
them after termination of the marital community, as tenants in common ....
The "aggregate" theory seems more appropriate in the dissolution context. Under
the "aggregate" theory, a [complex] partition of the whole community . . . is just
as much a partition as is a partition of each individual asset owned by the commu-
nity. (Citation omitted.)
The author suggests that the context in which the issue arises will determine which theory is
appropriate, and this appears to be the best view.
Much literature concerned with private rights under community property systems is not
concerned with the "aggregate-item" dichotomy. For example, W. DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1943) gives no consideration to the matter of the characterization of
rights under either theory. Similarly, Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington,
49 WASH. L. Rav. 729, 818 (1974), while covering the subject of spousal rights at divorce,
does not discuss these alternative characterizations. Regardless of whether a particular com-
munity property jurisdiction has overtly characterized its position in terms of the "aggre-
gate" theory, it is clear that the Tax Court has decided every case in the Walz line on the
basis of a latent assumption that, in the dissolution context, the spouses' rights in their
community property are those which are characterized by the aggregate theory.
The Tax Court is nonetheless aware of the competing characterization of spousal rights in
community property. This awareness is demonstrated in a recent decision in which Wash-
ington community property law was in issue, Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860,
873-74 (1978). In Lee it was necessary that the Tax Court determine whether or not the
surviving spouse's community interest could be satisfied by a non-pro rata distribution out
of the aggregate. Based on the construction of Washington's statute concerning testamen-
tary disposition of community property in In re Estate of Patton, 494 P.2d 238 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1972), the court in Lee held that the spouse had a vested right to an undivided one-
half interest in each asset. 69 T.C. at 875. Patton discusses the item theory in terms, but its
holding is limited to the matter of testamentary dispositions. 494 P.2d at 242-43. See also
Private Letter Ruling 8016050, supra note 53.
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incident to divorce is not a taxable event. 0 Moreover, the Walz
rule has been extended to certain divisions of property incident to
divorce in common law states.
D. Division of Jointly Acquired Property
Extension of Walz to common law states was precipitated by the
pivotal decision of United States v. Davis.61 The Court in Davis
held that the transfer of appreciated property in satisfaction of
marital rights is a disposition resulting in realized gain, the amount
realized being measured by the fair market value of the transferred
property.62 In Davis the taxpayer contended that the transfer was
comparable to a nontaxable division of property between two co-
owners. The Court accepted at face value the suggestion that the
transaction would be nontaxable if it involved a division of prop-
erty between co-owners comparable to the division of community
property between spouses incident to divorce, but the Court held
that the case before it did not involve the division of property.
"The taxpayer's analogy, however, stumbles on its own premise,
for the inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by
the Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-
ownership.""3
60. The rule of Walz and its progeny is accepted by the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. See Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213. Nontaxable partitions of community property
have been found in whole or in part in Carson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818
(1978); Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975); Wren v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M.
(CCH) 290 (1965); Davenport v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 856 (1953); Oliver v. Com-
missioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 403 (1949); and Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
The principle has been approved but found inapplicable because of separate consideration
paid for the interest of one spouse in Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326 (1979); Connor
v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1043 (1975); May v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH)
256 (1974); Showalter v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 192 (1974); Howard v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C. 1284 (1959); Edwards v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 65 (1954); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 948 (1953); and Rouse v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 908 (1946), aff'd,
159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
61. 370 U.S. 65 (1962). In two earlier cases, the Board of Tax Appeals had been reversed
for finding that a division of property under equitable division of property statutes
amounted to a nontaxable division, Halliwell v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 740, 748-49 (1941),
rev'd, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); Mesta v. Commissioner,
42 B.T.A. 933, 940-41 (1940), rev'd, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695
(1942), and this approach was not considered again by reported cases until Davis.
62. 370 U.S. at 68-75.
63. Id. at 70. Reviewing Delaware law, the Court noted that the wife had no rights in
management and disposition of the husband's personal property, that her rights to property
at divorce were not descendable, and that the state court would allow her to share in prop-
erty only to the extent that it deemed reasonable, taking into account such criteria as the
wife's financial condition and needs. The Court concluded that the wife's position was not
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Davis implicitly sanctioned the nontaxability of a division of
property among co-owners. Unfortunately, the Court did not spec-
ify the essential elements of such a nontaxable division. Davis ac-
tually is inapposite with the property division cases because the
spouse in Davis had no property interest in the marital assets. The
Court's remarks on the question of the division of property are
therefore clouded with Delphic ambiguities, but two inferences can
be drawn. It must be inferred that those divisions which the Court
assumed would not be taxable necessarily were the Walz commu-
nity property divisions, since at that time, only the Walz line of
community property cases had so treated divisions of property. It
would follow that the Court accepted the Walz rule at face value.
Moreover, it must be inferred that the Court entertained the possi-
bility that Walz is not confined to community property states, for
Davis dealt with the wife's interest under Delaware law more ex-
tensively than would have been required if the Court viewed Walz
as peculiar to community property cases-a point which could
have been made in a sentence. Beyond these two implications, Da-
vis offers little guidance.
Subsequent to Davis, the nontaxable division has been an issue
in several common law states, and taxpayers in two states have
succeeded in characterizing local equitable property division laws
as creating rights having the dignity of co-ownership. In Collins v.
Commissioner, the Tenth Circuit ultimately accepted a characteri-
zation of the interest of an Oklahoma spouse as a species of co-
ownership. 4 Oklahoma law thus was found to create a form of co-
ownership sufficiently similar to community property to warrant
similar treatment. Based on this characterization of the Oklahoma
"jointly acquired property," the Tenth Circuit conceded that a di-
vision of jointly acquired property in the nature of a complex par-
tition was a nontaxable division of the property between its co-
owners.
6 5
an interest in property. Instead it partook of a personal liability or burden on the husband's
property. Id.
64. This matter was determined in a legal marathon involving George F. Collins. In the
Collins cases, the taxpayer lost in the Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit, but prevailed in the
Supreme Court. Collins v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 461 (1966) (Collins I), af'd, 388 F.2d 353
(10th Cir.) (Collins II), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968) (Collins IV). On re-
mand, the Tenth Circuit reversed Collins I. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir.
1969) (Collins V). See also Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968)
(Collins III) (Oklahoma Supreme Court holds for taxpayer in parallel state action).
65. 412 F.2d 211, 212 (10th Cir. 1969). This characterization was supplied by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in the parallel state tax action:
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Collins has been criticized by commentators. It is said to be
poorly reasoned because it attached federal tax consequences to
the label ("species of common ownership") given to the property
rights in the state court proceedings.6 Actually nothing was said
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the parallel state proceedings
that had not already been conceded in the Tax Court when it had
held against the taxpayer. Moreover the "species of common own-
ership" label was supplied by an early Oklahoma case6" and was
not invented for the tax occasion. The reversal of position by the
Tenth Circuit (which followed after the state court had ruled in its
parallel state action) seems to have been influenced more by the
terms of the remand of the United States Supreme Court in Col-
lins6" than by the holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's remand is significant. It indicates that the
lower courts had misinterpreted Davis. The Tax Court had con-
ceded that the jointly acquired property doctrine under Oklahoma
law created a species of co-ownership conceptually similar to com-
munity property, 9 but the Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit had
regarded this as irrelevant because both courts confined Davis to
cases involving true community property and to cases involving ex-
pressly created legal joint ownership.70 The remand in Collins
shows this was not the correct interpretation of Davis.
Following Collins, Colorado law also has been brought within the
nontaxable division rule. A federal district court in Colorado, sub-
The nature of the wife's interest is similar in conception to community property
of community property states, and is regarded as held by a species of common
ownership. The fact record title is in the husband by reason of conveyance or
contract does not destroy such joint ownership, since the plain language of the
statute precludes such requirement. . .. The purpose to be accomplished by
equitable division is a complete severance of common title, so the portion awarded
each is free from claims or domination of the other. . . . The nature of the estate
subject to division is not a matter of judicial discretion. . . . Although one spouse
brings separate property to the marriage, enhanced value resulting from joint ef-
forts, skill or funds of both working together constitutes jointly acquired property
subject to division. . . The statutory division may be decreed even though the
court does not dissolve the marriage.
Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968) (citations omitted).
66. E.g., Hull, supra note 57, at 36.04; Note, Tax Consequences of Divisions of Jointly
Owned and Community Property Incident to Divorce, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1975).
See also Lawson, Tax Implications of Using Appreciated Property in a Property Settle-
ment, 43 J. TAX. 58, 59 (1975).
67. Thompson v. Thompson, 173 P. 1037 (Okla. 1918).
68. 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
69. 46 T.C. 461, 471 (1966).
70. Id., 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
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sequently affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, determined that Colo-
rado's jointly acquired property statute, like Oklahoma's, created
essentially the same set of rights, analogous to community prop-
erty and eligible for nontaxable treatment." Collins has not been
extended to other states,7' and it does not presently appear that
there are any other common law states whose laws are sufficiently
analogous to community property laws to warrant further
extension.8
Assuming the Oklahoma and Colorado cases rightly decided that
the property there at issue had the indicia of co-ownership, they
appear to be valid applications of the rule developed in the Walz
cases. The jointly acquired property can be seen to have that
polychotomous singularity which is the syndetic feature of commu-
nity property for purposes of the Walz rule. During coverture, as
the spouses acquire and dispose of property, its jointly acquired
status depends on the joint industry and contribution of the
spouses and their marital status and not on the election as to how
title is taken. The interest of neither spouse is specific or several,
and a judicially determined partition may effect a disproportionate
division.7 4
E. Division of Entireties Property5
Walz has been applied in cases involving division of jointly
owned property incident to divorce in common law states. Al-
though those cases have not considered the property distinction
which exists between common law joint property and community
71. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974), afl'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th
Cir. 1975). See also In re Questions Submitted by the U.S. Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo.
1974).
72. E.g., Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (Iowa); Kraut v. United
States, 316 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (Wisconsin); Dunn v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 664 (1977) (Tennessee); Wiles v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 56 (1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 255
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974) (Kansas); Swaim v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 302
(1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969) (Kentucky).
73. See, e.g., Hull, supra note 57, at 1 36.04. But cf. Bosch v. United States, 590 F.2d 165
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 731 (1980) (Florida doctrine of special equities cre-
ates a species of property, but the doctrine depends on unique facts and is distinguishable
from the generally applicable Oklahoma and Colorado statutes).
74. As noted in Thomsen v. Thomsen, 159 P. 1054, 1056 (Cal. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1916),
the court has the power to give the cows to one and the horses to the other.
75. The term "entireties property" is used loosely to signify jointly owned assets of a
married couple, title to which is in both names. The term is not limited to its common law
sense, and it excludes community property, and equitable joint property. This section is an
expansion of an earlier article. Kaney & Aylward, Nontaxable Divisions of Jointly Owned
Property Incident to Divorce, 53 FLA. B.J. 257 (1979).
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property, that distinction has much significance for the tax
analysis.
Legal joint ownership of property, although the interest of each
spouse has the dignity of co-ownership, 6 differs markedly from
community property and jointly acquired property. The joint title
arises item by item and only by the act of the parties. What is joint
and what is separate bears no necessary relation to property ac-
quired during coverture. If one jointly owned asset is disposed of,
the parties must elect whether to hold the proceeds jointly or sev-
erally. At divorce, this property is subject to voluntary or judicial
partition, but it has no inherent syndetic unity. The right of each
spouse is a right to a discrete item of property. Except where spe-
cial equities are present, the court's power to partition the prop-
erty is the same as the court's power to partition property among
any common tenants, although its powers to award alimony and
satisfy rights of a spouse such as those involved in Davis may per-
mit alterations of proportionate interests.7 7
When the tax consequences of a complex partition of common
law jointly owned property have been considered by the courts, the
partitions have in each case been held to be nontaxable divisions of
property between co-owners. Some of the cases are poorly rational-
ized and stretch the Walz rule but, if carefully confined, they do
not break the rule of Walz. Thus far, each case can be understood
to turn on facts showing joint acquisition as in Collins, coupled
with the legal joint title as required by Davis. On these facts the
cases present no doctrinal discontinuity, but the analyses em-
ployed in the cases generally fail to reveal a clear understanding of
the rule. The cases can be reviewed in light of this doctrinal
difficulty.
The earliest case is Cofield v. Koehler, a district court opinion
76. See Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972), afl'd per
curiam, 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
77. See generally G. THOMPSON, COMMENrARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 1784 (1979) (estate by the entireties exists by virtue of title acquired during marriage); 41
Am. JUR. 2d Husband and Wife § 57 (1968) (estate arises upon a conveyance to husband
and wife); id. § 71 (severance by decree of divorce results in partible tenancy in common).
See also Bosch v. United States, 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 731
(1980). No singularity attaches to entireties property of the spouses merely because the
property is held by that title, but cases abound where there is, nevertheless, a factual corre-
lation between joint acquisition during coverture and joint title. A widely practiced custom
of common law marriages is to hold title to jointly acquired assets as tenants by the entire-
ties. Jointly acquired property of a long-term couple, as a matter of fact, often will be held
in legal joint ownership.
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involving Kansas law.78 The court found that when the marriage
began, neither spouse had any significant properties and that the
marital property had been acquired through their joint activities. 9
The issue was whether the husband realized income from accrued
interest on a substantial amount of Series "E" Bonds. As the court
understood the issue, the interest would be realized by the hus-
band if the transfer to the wife "resulted in a taxable incident,"
which it held had not occurred.80
[T]he transfer of these bonds to the wife did not result in realiza-
tion of income to the husband. He exchanged these bonds in
which each had an undivided one-half interest, including the ac-
crued interest, for other property of equal value, also jointly
owned by them. The effect of the divorce decree did no more than
set apart to each in severalty the interest they owned in their
community property. They gained nothing and they lost
nothing.8 1
This, indeed, is a case of great interest to the present discussion.
It is arguably the best analyzed of the lot, dealing in a straightfor-
ward manner with the realization concept by considering whether
the taxpayers changed position. "They gained nothing and they
lost nothing."8 Again, the echo of the "something really different"
test of Steam. The decision is technically precise in that it de-
scribed what happened as an exchange from which no gain was re-
alized, avoiding the arbitrary denial that a sale or exchange had
occurred.
78. 207 F. Supp. 73 (D. Kan. 1962).
79. The court in Cofield noted:
She was equally competent with him in business matters. They continued in busi-
ness as business partners both in the lumber business and in various other busi-
ness enterprises. They were successful and accumulated a considerable estate con-
sisting of personal property, including a substantial amount of Government Series
"E" Bonds, as well as a large amount of real estate. The Series "E" Bonds were
issued in their joint names .... [T]he judgment of the [state divorce] court
awarded the wife permanent alimony in the sum of $5,000.00, and set aside to her
as her separate property, one-half of the jointly accumulated property specifically
described in the decree.
Included in the property set aside to her were United States Savings Bonds in
the approximate amount of $50,225.00 .... The [state] court specifically found
that these bonds were the joint accumulations of the husband and wife and were
not purchased from separate funds of the wife.
Id. at 73-74.
80. Id. at 74.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
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In this decision the separateness of the realization requirement
is evident. The case is on sound ground when it approaches the
question of realization through the equal value rule, noting that
bonds were "exchanged" for "other property of equal value," the
latter being a phrase from Walz.83 The case is seriously deficient,
however, because no reference is made to the authorities upon
which the court bases its decision. Nevertheless, that the court in-
arguably is applying Walz is revealed by the reference to the equal
value of the exchange and the cryptic reference to the joint assets
as "community property." In effect, the court determined that the
jointly owned properties were sufficiently analogous to community
property to justify application of the Walz rule. The analogy to
community property is based on the joint accumulation. Both
spouses started their marriage with no property. During the mar-
riage each participated as a partner in business ventures in which
each was equally competent. The result is jointly owned property,
jointly accumulated."
Florida tenancy by the entireties property was involved in Beth
W. Corp. v. United States (Beth Corp.).85 Beth Corp. presents se-
rious difficulties. Like Cofield, it is sparsely supported; unlike Co-
field, it is poorly reasoned. The court does not articulate any facts
of the case which could establish the critical link to community
property or jointly acquired property cases. In fact, much of the
court's effort was directed toward distinguishing Davis, an effort
which, while eminently successful, did not meet the issue. The
court went to great lengths to demonstrate that the interest of the
Florida wife in tenancy by the entireties property rises to the "dig-
nity of co-ownership."s As the court understood Davis, it seemed
83. Id.
84. Id. at 73. Judge Scott of the Tax Court shares this analysis of Cofield. In Gerlach v.
Commissioner, she distinguished Cofield, but observed: "[If the jointly owned property in-
volved in Cofield. . . is to be treated comparable to 'community property'. . . the conclu-
sion in that case is in line with our holding in [Waz] ...... 55 T.C. 156, 171 (1970).
85. 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972), af'd mem., 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974). The parties had been married approximately 31 years, owned
all relevant property as tenants by the entireties, and effected a complex partition of the
property incident to divorce. The partitioning transfers were not in exchange for any rights
of the wife other than her interest in the entireties property. 350 F. Supp. at 1191. The
court found that the property division had been intended as an "equal division," accepting
the husband's testimony to the effect that: "[Tihe basis for the apportionment of property
between him and his wife in the property settlement agreement was an attempt to arrive at
a 50% -50% division of the jointly owned property, based upon current market values," and
holding that the "transaction resembles a non-taxable division of property between coown-
ers." Id. at 1192.
86. Id. at 1191.
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to it necessary merely to reach this determination in order to dis-
tinguish Davis and conclude that the transaction was not taxable.
The only other authority considered on the question of the taxa-
bility of the division was dictum from Hornback v. United
States. T The Beth Corp. court's discussion of Hornback, however,
was relegated to distinguishing its authority. It is difficult to resist
the temptation to conclude that the court in Beth Corp. was under
the erroneous impression that once Davis was distinguished, the
conclusion that the transfer was nontaxable necessarily followed."
Beth Corp. was cited in a Tax Court memorandum decision con-
cerning a complex division of jointly owned property, Pokusa v.
Commissioner."' Pokusa involved the question of basis for comput-
ing gain realized by the wife upon a subsequent disposition. The
government contended for a transferred basis from a nontaxable
division, and the taxpayer contended for a cost basis from a taxa-
ble division.90 The court found that the parties were co-owners of
the property and emphasized that: "[T]he record indicates that the
[spouses] accumulated their property through their joint efforts
87. 298 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Mo. 1969). In Hornback, the joint properties were impartible
so the husband gave the wife a promissory note in an amount equal to one-half of the value
of the joint holdings, and she conveyed her interest in the joint holdings to the husband. 298
F. Supp. at 980. Hornback held this exchange to be a taxable sale, but by way of dictum, the
court also discussed simple and complex partitions, suggesting that an equal value complex
partition would be nontaxable. Id. at 981. Hornback, however, cited only Wren v. Commis-
sioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290 (1965), a community property case, although the Hornback
dictum concerns common law jointly owned property.
88. 350 F. Supp. at 1190. Some suggestions can be found if the report of Beth Corp. is
searched for those elements which, as in Cofield, would link the several entireties properties
into an aggregate and therefore make it "comparable to community property." The marriage
had endured for more than 30 years, and the government succeeded in submitting to the
jury, as an alternative argument for nontaxability of the transfers, a question as to whether
the spouses had actually been partners. Id. at 1192. If such facts were present, then Beth
Corp. can be explained as continuous with Walz, Collins, and Cofield. Since the government
prevailed in Beth Corp., the suspected presence of joint accumulation facts is especially
meaningful, for it can be assumed that the case is understood in this way by the
government.
89. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 434, 437 (1978). The marriage in Pokusa had lasted 21 years, dur-
ing which time the parties were domiciled in common law states. At the time of the mar-
riage, neither party owned any "appreciable property." During their marriage, by the joint
efforts and contributions of the spouses, a substantial collection of property was acquired
and held by them in joint ownership. The parties were divorced by a decree in Delaware,
but they did not then divide their property, and so became tenants in common of their
jointly owned property. About 15 months after the divorce, pursuant to an agreement, the
parties effected a complex partition of the joint properties. The agreement made no refer-
ence to release of the wife's marital rights as a condition of the division of the property. Id.
at 435.
90. Id. at 436.
TAXATION OF PARTITIONS
and contributions."9 1 As the court understood the issue, the parties
were co-owners of the property, and since the property division in-
volved no release of marital rights, the "division of their property
will be a nontaxable event if such division was intended to be
equal."9 On the facts, the taxpayer's effort to show inequality in
the division was unpersuasive. The court held the original division
nontaxable.93
The Internal Revenue Service has issued one ruling, Revenue
Ruling 74-347, on the noncommunity property division question
and has under consideration a proposed new ruling on the ques-
tion. 4 The published ruling considered the tax consequences of a
disproportionate division of several items of jointly owned prop-
erty. The facts surrounding the acquisition of property are as
follows:
A husband and wife were married in 1953 when each had ap-
proximately $600 in assets. Neither received an inheritance or gift
of any significance during the marriage. Both husband and wife
were employed throughout the marriage and their earnings were
commingled so that it was impossible to determine whose earn-
ings were used to purchase any given asset.
In 1973, the wife was granted a divorce. The total assets owned
by the husband and wife had a net fair market value of $110,000
91. Id.
92. Id. at 436-37 (citing Beth Corp.).
93. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 434 (1978). Although the court in Pokusa emphasized the joint
accumulation of the joint property, it is possible to understand the emphasis on this point
was directed to the ambiguous record as to whether the property was legally owned as ten-
ants by the entireties. It does not appear that the court in Pokusa intended to suggest that
joint accumulation of the property is comparable to community property. If that were the
case, it can be speculated that this judge also believes the law to be that by showing that
there was a property interest in the transferee spouse, so that the transfer is not in settle-
ment of marital rights, the division is nontaxable if "intended" to be equal. On the other
hand, such speculation aside, Pokusa can readily be connected to Cofield, Collins and Walz
because it involves an equal value division of property held in tenancy by the entireties,
which property was jointly accumulated, and constitutes an aggregate of property in which
there are floating equities to be considered as well as separate items of ownership.
94. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. On August 30, 1979, the Service issued Private
Letter Ruling 7948083 applying Rev. Rul. 74-347 to similar facts. On December 28, 1979,
Private Letter Ruling 8012092 revoked the August ruling and announced that a proposed
revenue ruling concerning noncommunity property states is under consideration. At the
deadline for publication of this article, the new ruling had not been issued. In the face of the
Service's silence it is appropriate to observe that the article at 53 FLA. B.J. 257, supra note
75, appears to have been the first published comment on the incomplete analysis of Rev.
Rul. 74-347. Although the present article suggests an analysis upon which Rev. Rul. 74-347
can be suggested, the objective is not to predict judicial or administrative behavior but to
comment on the principals which should be considered in the cases and rulings.
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at the time of the divorce. The jointly-owned property, that it,
the property either purchased with the earnings of both the hus-
band and the wife or received by means of a completed gift, con-
sisted of several assets having a combined net fair market value of
$70,000. The husband's separately owned property had a net fair
market value of $40,000. The wife owned no property in her own
capacity."
The divorce decree awarded the wife jointly owned property hav-
ing a value of $55,000. The remainder of the jointly owned prop-
erty, and all of the separately owned property was awarded to the
husband. Alimony and support for the children was separately pro-
vided for.96 The ruling states:
The married couple did not reside in a community property
State at the time of the divorce. Under the applicable State law,
the wife's interest in her husband's separately-owned property
was not the equivalent of coownership since her only rights in her
husband's separately-owned property were either inchoate or en-
titled her to an equitable distribution of property upon divorce.97
The ruling considers the question whether the unequal division of
the jointly owned property constitutes a taxable transfer, but as-
sumes that to the extent the division of the jointly owned property
was equal, it was nontaxable. By implication, the ruling accepts
some variation of the Cofield, Beth Corp., Pokusa doctrine.
Announcing the principle of the Davis case, the ruling adverts to
the dignity of co-ownership statement therein, and continues, cit-
ing Collins: "Property may be coowned where (1) title to it is taken
jointly under State property law, (2) the State is a community
property law State, or (3) State property law is found to be similar
to community property law."98 Under the facts of the ruling, "only
the jointly-owned property of the husband and wife is within the
scope of the term 'coownership."'99 Thus, the ruling holds:
[Slince the wife's interest in her husband's separately-owned
property was not the equivalent of coownership, the unequal divi-
sion of jointly owned property awarded the wife constitutes a tax-
able exchange of a portion of the husband's jointly-owned prop-
95. Id. at 26.
96. Id. at 27.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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erty for the wife's marital rights in the husband's separately-
owned property. 00
By glossing this ruling, the doctrinal connection to the Walz rule
can be made, but the Service's current reconsideration of the issue
may indicate that this connection was not considered in 1974. The
ruling stresses joint accumulations: this factor associates its hold-
ing with the joint accumulation criterion involved in Collins and
also present in Cofield. The ruling holds that the governing state
law was neither community property law nor comparable to com-
munity property law.
Because the ruling sets up three categories in which co-owner-
ship will be recognized, it must be taken that the first cate-
gory-that consisting of property title to which is "taken jointly
under State property law"' 01-was involved in the case posited by
the ruling. It must further be inferred that to some extent the
unallocable joint accumulation of the property from commingled
earnings is also a factor in rendering the division nontaxable. If
these inferences are correct, then the ruling indicates the Service's
position to be that a distinction exists between jointly owned prop-
erty which is also jointly acquired property, on the one hand, and
jointly owned property which is not jointly acquired property on
the other. The position of the Service no doubt will be clarified,
and perhaps changed, when the new ruling is issued
If the entireties cases are rightly understood as applying the
Walz rule where joint ownership is coupled with joint accumula-
tion, then these cases are in line with Walz. They represent argua-
ble extensions of the notion that a polychotomous aggregate is a
single unit of property for purposes of realization analysis. The
unifying factor in these cases is the intertwining tangle of equities
which would make it impossible to determine the precise interest
of each spouse. Without such unity, the cases could not be distin-
guished from the Revenue Ruling 79-441°2 taxable exchange.
F. Nonrealization vs. Nonrecognition
The partition cases are rarely approved on doctrinal grounds.108
They draw hostile criticism from commentators who reason that
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 1979-1 C.B. 265.
103. Schwartz, supra note 57, at 186 comes closest to approval.
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taxable exchanges are being overlooked,"" and they draw faint
praise from courts and commentators who regard them as wrongly
decided but commendable as judicial legislation.10 5 Both lines of
criticism proceed from the assumption, express or implied, that
every exchange is a taxable event and from the apparent assump-
tion that simple partitions do not involve exchanges. Both criti-
cisms should be considered.
In an early article, typical of hostile criticism, Taylor and
Schwartz argue that each spouse is deemed to own "an interest in
each of the specific assets . . . rather than an interest in the com-
munity itself,"10' 6 and that Walz and its progeny are wrongly de-
cided. The authors advance this argument by constructing an ex-
ample of parallel joint ownership of a farm and corporate stock,
virtually identical to the model used above to illustrate simple and
complex partitions. With respect to a complex partition between
unrelated parties, they argue: "This transaction is not a partition
(since each receives all of one piece of property) . . . . Therefore,
gain or loss from the sale would certainly be recognized. 10 7 The
authors argue that the result ought to be the same between a di-
vorcing or separating married couple.108 It is significant that Taylor
and Schwartz assumed that a simple partition would be nontaxable
both with respect to the fungible stock and with respect to the
nonfungible lands.109 Those who criticize the Walz treatment of
complex partitions for the most part accept the nontaxability of
simple partitions of nonfungible property. 1 0
Walz is more nearly like a simple partition than might appear at
first analysis. The simple partition and the complex partition are
similar in these respects: (1) an exchange is present in each; (2)
after the exchange, the parties own in severalty that which was for-
merly owned in common; and (3) that which is owned in severalty
after the exchange necessarily differs from that which was previ-
ously owned in common.
Several ownership is, per se, different from common ownership.
104. See, e.g., Taylor & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 56; Hull, supra note 57, at 1 36.05.
105. See, e.g., Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 963 (1975), a/ffd, 552 F.2d 1350
(9th Cir. 1977); FREEIAND, LND, & STEPHENS, supra note 15, at 155-66.
106. Taylor & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 56.
107. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., FVm.BLAN, LUN, & STEPHENS, supra note 15, at 165; Hull, supra note 57,
at 35.05. Cf. Note, supra note 66, at 1038 (unsupported assumption that simple partitions
are nontaxable is premise for justifying rule in complex cases).
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Such a difference can provoke taxation in some cases. Revenue
Ruling 68-633,111 at the apex of a line of cases stretching back to
Allen v. Commissioner,"2 holds that the conversion of certificates
of participation in a fixed investment trust into the underlying in-
vestments of the trust, even if exchanged strictly pro rata, consti-
tutes a taxable exchange. The ruling states:
In this case A received something different from the property
right surrendered. While A had an equitable interest in all stock
owned by the trust, she did not have an exclusive beneficial inter-
est therein. When she terminated the trust relationship, she sur-
rendered her interest in the shares remaining in the trust. The
transaction effected a substantial change in a property interest
and represents an exchange within the meaning of section 1002 of
the Code.' 8
Though otherwise distinguishable,1 4 this ruling is of interest be-
cause it attaches a taxable significance to the difference between
exclusive ownership and nonexclusive ownership of the same prop-
erty. The surrender of the undivided interest in the shares which
remained in the trust, in exchange for the entire interest in the
shares received, was considered a taxable change in the taxpayer's
position. If this analysis were applied to the simple partition, the
several ownership of the same thing which formerly was owned in
common could be seen as a substantially different interest in prop-
111. 1968-2 C.B. 329.
112. 49 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 655 (1931).
113. 1968-2 C.B. at 330.
114. The cases discussed in the text can be distinguished in that: (1) they concern distri-
butions out of trusts, not co-ownership; and (2) large numbers of people are involved. It is
also instructive to compare the treatment of other transactions which are loosely analogous.
In the case of partnerships, it was established by an early regulation that a partner did not
realize gain or loss upon receipt of a distribution in kind in liquidation. Tress. Reg. 45, art.
1570, Act of 1918. In 1939, the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the then pertinent regulation
upon the analysis that a distribution in kind, "does not confer title to the assets upon the
members, but is merely an apportioning among them of what they already owned jointly."
Crawford v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 521, 524 (1939). This language echoes that of Walz
and Stearn. See text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra. Earlier, Judge Learned Hand
suggested this regulation was of doubtful validity, a suggestion that is consistent with his
opinion in Allen v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 655 (1931).
Of course, the rule is now codified at I.R.C. § 731. Distributions in kind by corporations
were treated differently from the earliest days of the income tax law. Although the roughest
sort of analogy might have been drawn, the Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234,
43 Stat. 253 (1924), instituted treatment of liquidation as a sale of stock by the stockholder.
See generally B. BrrrKE & J. EusTns, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 11.03 (4th ed. 1979).
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erty, sufficiently different to effect a realization.
Of course, this analysis has not been applied to partitions, but
the fact that it could have been serves to illustrate that even the
simple partition involves not only an exchange but also the receipt
of different property. Moreover, a simple partition of nonfungible
property may result in the receipt of different property than the
property which was surrendered in yet another respect. None of
the cases actually extend to the point, but the cited authorities as-
sume that the partition of a single tract of land into two separate
tracts is a simple nontaxable partition.' 15 Taylor and Schwartz
held this opinion before Revenue Ruling 56-437. In the simple par-
tition of Blackacre it necessarily follows that the actual property
received by Adam differs not only in that it is owned exclusively in
severalty but also because it is different property. According to
common law, each acre or parcel of land is unique.
A simple partition never results in receipt of precisely the same
property. The property is different in that it is several, and might
be different in other respects as well. Therefore the complex parti-
tion held nontaxable under Walz is not readily distinguished from
the simple partition when viewed in this light. The distinction can
only be found in the manner in which the property is owned, in the
postulate which binds the community estate and its analogs into
one unit for purposes of the analysis.1"
The Walz rule has fared well in spite of its unfriendly critics but
it faces virtual extinction from friendly critics. Having failed to
perceive the root of the rule in the realization doctrine or, perceiv-
ing it, having failed to accept its legitimacy, the courts choose to
accept the rule as judicial legislation. The rule has come to be seen
as a rule defining recognition. In 1975 Judge Hall of the Tax Court,
in Carrieres v. Commissioner,117 considered the Walz rule in a case
which appears to mark the point where the reason underlying the
rule was finally lost. Unable otherwise to explain the rule, Judge
Hall remarked:
Usually, unless otherwise expressly provided in the Code, gain
from the sale or exchange of property is recognized for tax pur-
poses .... However, the judge-made, well-settled law concerning
the division of community property upon a divorce makes excep-
115. See, e.g., FREMLAND, LIND, & SEPHENS, supra note 15, at 165; Hull, supra note 57,
at 35.05. See also Note, supra note 66, at 1038.
116. See Thomsen v. Thomsen, 159 P. 1054 (Cal. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1916).
117. 64 T.C. 959 (1975), aff'd, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
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tions to that general rule. In effect, a nonstatutory nonrecognition
rule has been created.l"'
Judge Hall seemed uncomfortable with this nonstatutory rule of
nonrecognition, linking the realistic notion of judicial lawmaking
with the traditional rule of stare decisis ("judge-made, well-settled
law"). 119
Other commentators have accepted the Carrieres characteriza-
tion of the rule enthusiastically. Freeland, Lind, and Stephens
meet the issue with self-acknowledged realism, agreeing that the
statute should apply: "Even though all the property involved is
community property, exchanges easily recognized by the tax lawyer
are taking place; and there is no statutory exception to the recogni-
tion of gain or loss seemingly required by § 1001(c)." 1 20 With re-
spect to Judge Hall's description of the rule as a nonstatutory rule
of nonrecognition, these authors suggest: "Probably anyone not se-
riously allergic to judicial legislation applauds this result." ''
It is not necessarily correct that the Walz cases override the
statutory command to recognize gain. The cases can be understood
to have developed a reasonable and justifiable rule of nonrealiza-
tion founded solidly upon fundamental, statutory principle. To say
the rule exempts a taxable gain merely because exchanges can be
seen to occur overlooks the key point of this analysis: the require-
ment of realization is distinct from the requirement of disposition.
Moreover, while it is possible to quarrel with the Walz notion that
a single, polychotomous unit can be the subject of a nonrealization
division, the courts are within the reasonable bounds of judicial
discretion in developing this doctrine out of the practical notion of
realization. Upon what logic can this functional concept be rejected
as contrary to the statute in favor of an outright, dysfunctional
disregard of the statute?
The Walz cases cannot rightly be explained as judicial legisla-
tion for two reasons. First, as judicial legislation, the Walz rule
would be beyond the proper scope of the lawmaking discretion of
118. 64 T.C. at 963 (citation omitted). Judge Hall's notion of the rule as a nonrecogni-
tion rule was repeated in the most recent of the cases, Carson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 818, 820 (1978): "Despite this effective exchange of interests in the property, the
arrangement is treated as a nontaxable partition. The origin of this exception is in the early
case of [Walz]." (Emphasis added.)
119. 64 T.C. at 959. "What is wrong with reading the statute?" Focht v. Commissioner,
68 T.C. 223, 244 (1977) (Hall, J., dissenting).
120. FREELAND, LIND, & STEP'zNS, supra note 15, at 165.
121, Id. at 166.
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the courts. Second, if viewed as legislation, the rule would create
an arbitrary and capricious distinction. These aspects of the legis-
lative explanation of the rule should be considered.
Modern legal realistic thought recognizes that the American ju-
dicial process cannot be understood unless it is acknowledged that
courts make laws even when engaged in the process of interpreting
and applying statutes. 122 This is especially true in federal income
taxation, because the meaning of statutory gross income and,
therefore, to a large extent, the scope of the statute itself has been
delegated to the courts.1 2 3 Nevertheless, a clear understanding of
the fact that law is made by judges ought not to obscure the proper
bounds within which this lawmaking function must occur.
It was Justice Frankfurter's sound view that interpretation of
statutes required of courts only so much lawmaking as is necessary
to carry out formulated policy, but not to initiate policy. 2" In some
cases these lines may be blurred, but where the court clearly per-
ceives the statutory policy, it is the court's duty to observe it.125 On
the other hand, of course, courts commit acts of lawmaking beyond
proper limits where statutory intent is clear to the court but sim-
ply ignored as a matter of policy. "This is law-making of the
usurpatory variety, and though as bald as the bald eagle, is per-
haps also as rare. ' '1 6
If understood as a judge-made rule of nonrecognition, the Walz
line of cases would be judicial lawmaking of the usurpatorial vari-
ety. The legislative command to tax these gains always has been
clear and unambiguous, yet, on this view, the courts have ignored
the command. Based on such unjustifiable grounds, a nonstatutory
122. E.g., Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning,
36 IND. L.J. 414 (1961).
123. Surrey & Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute: Gross
Income, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66
HAv. L. REv. 761, 770-71 (1953).
124. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
534 (1947). Justice Frankfurter expressed the limits in his article as follows:
[T]o say that. . . courts make law just as do legislatures is to deny essential fea-
tures in the history of our democracy. It denies that legislation and adjudication
have had different lines of growth, served vitally different purposes, function
under different conditions, and bear different responsibilities .... In short,
judges are not unfettered glossators.
Id. at 534. See also Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942).
125. See Cohen, supra note 122, at 415.
126. Id. See also Chazo, Determinacy and Deliberation: An Inquiry Concerning Foren-
sic Epistemology, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. Rev. 237, 238 (1979) ("There is no profit to be gained in
idle lamentations over the loss of enlightened innocence, or the corrupting sophistication of
modernism.").
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rule of nonrecognition is flatly beyond proper bounds of judicial
power. The doctrine of realization is a chief instrument in judicial
determination of the definition of gross income, but Congress has
reserved to itself the policy determination as to the precise circum-
stances under which realized income should not be recognized.1 27
The line is clear, and any nonstatutory rule of nonrecognition
would cross it.1 28
The Walz line of cases, if viewed as judicial legislation, is not
merely vulnerable to the charge of usurpatorial judicial legislation,
but also open to challenge as arbitrary and capricious legislation.
In Davis, the Court held a disposition of property taxable even
though the dispositions were incident to divorce. If Walz is a non-
recognition rule, then the Walz cases hold dispositions of property
nontaxable, merely because the dispositions are incident to di-
vorce. If, as in Walz, the statute is to be ignored when property is
exchanged for property, why cannot the same statute be ignored
when, as in Davis, property is transferred in discharge of a burden
thereon? From a legislative policy standpoint, both cases should be
treated the same. In both cases a transfer of property is required
solely because a marriage existed between two parties. The com-
munity property cases compel the transfer by means of community
property laws while the common law states compel the transfer
through equitable apportionment laws or permanent alimony laws.
Distinctions between the two legal systems have considerable sig-
nificance to the courts, but should not to the legislature. Federal
tax policy factors at divorce are identical for community property
and common law states. In fact, Congress has evidenced a strong,
consistent policy of equating, for tax purposes, the transfer of
property via community property law with transfers via common
law. 2 The distinction which Davis based on the "facts of life"'180
recognized this uniform policy. Yet based on the existing legisla-
tive standards, the Court found that a judicial distinction had to
be drawn between the cases. Any view of the Walz rule as a non-
recognition rule is inconsistent with both Davis and Collins.
G. The Rationale of Nontaxability
The first purpose of this article is to explain the nontaxability of
127. See generally Cohen, note 122 supra.
128. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3); 1001(c).
129. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 2056, 2523.
130. 370 U.S. at 71.
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divisions of property between its co-owners. A sound justification
for otherwise puzzling case law is found in the realization doctrine.
The cases are difficult to analyze, because the early cases fail to
connect themselves to the governing line of authority, and the later
cases fail to perceive the conceptual connection and to reason ac-
cordingly. Throughout these cases, the phrase "nontaxable division
of property between co-owners" is repeated uncritically, as if this
litany were a reason instead of an anodyne for the pains of reason-
ing. Because of the resort to labeling instead of reasoning in the
cases, it is appropriate to briefly reiterate the logic of a defensible
nonrealization doctrine.
The statutory taxable event occurs when a disposition of prop-
erty results in the realization of gain or loss. Disposition and reali-
zation are concurrent elements of the taxable event. A partition in
kind, no matter how simple, always takes the form of an exchange.
The exchange is a disposition, but no gain or loss necessarily is
realized from this disposition. Only those exchanges which effect a
taxable change in property will give rise to realization of gain or
loss. The courts have not treated the conversion into several own-
ership of that which was held in common ownership as a sufficient
change of property to require realization of gain or loss.131
This analysis is most readily accepted when a single item of
property is divided, but the Walz line of cases extends the analysis
to disproportionate divisions of certain aggregates of disparate
items. The courts chose to regard the community estate (and its
analogs) as a single, partible unit, the division of which is nontax-
able for the same reason that a simple partition is nontaxable.
Critics of the complex partition cases, including those who re-
gard them as judicial nonrecognition exchanges, have not fully ar-
ticulated the analysis upon which the criticism is based. It is usu-
ally suggested that complex partitions are taxable because they
involve exchanges,132 but this is not a completely articulated argu-
ment. At the root of these critical analyses, it is believed that one
of two arguments can be found.
One argument involves the premise that all exchanges are taxa-
ble. It would run as follows:
All partitions are exchanges. All exchanges are taxable disposi-
tions. Therefore, all partitions are taxable dispositions.
131. See Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211
(10th Cir. 1969); Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
132. See Hull, supra note 57, at 36.05; Taylor & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 56.
TAXATION OF PARTITIONS
Although this syllogism could have been derived from a literal
reading of the statute, it was not. The minor premise never has
been accepted in the law. It is contradicted by Stearn and by
Treasury Regulations § 1.1001-1(a). 133
A variation of the argument that complex partitions are taxable
because all exchanges are taxable seeks to distinguish the special
treatment of simple partitions on the ground that the simple parti-
tion is not, in fact, an exchange. This argument uses words such as
"division" or "severance" to describe the simple partition. It is not
possible to understand partitions in these terms, however, because
an act of exchange between the co-owners is necessary to sever or
divide even a single item. It appears that the attempt to character-
ize simple partitions as non-exchanges is a forced line of reasoning
made necessary by the need to distinguish the nontaxability of
simple partitions from the taxability of transactions such as that in
Revenue Ruling 79-44. Since the line of reasoning proceeds from
the assumption that all exchanges are taxable, the argument must
explain the conceded nontaxability of the simple partitions in
other terms.
A second argument would begin with a premise which accepts
the nontaxability of certain exchanges. It proceeds:
Granting that every exchange is not taxable, those partition ex-
changes which do not result in a taxable change of property are
only those exchanges which divide a single item of property; all
other partitions are taxable. The community estate (and its ana-
logs) consist of several, disparate items of property and not a sin-
gle item. Therefore, the complex, disproportionate partition of
such items involves taxable exchanges.
This argument draws on the obvious factual distinction between
simple and complex partitions. It assumes too much, however,
when it assumes there is a clear line of distinction between single
items and polychotomous items. Further, this analysis is legally
precluded by Davis and Collins, because the polychotomous aggre-
gate is the partible unit to which each case referred. The major
premise of this argument is, therefore, contradicted by the neces-
sary implications of Davis and Collins. If these implications are
accepted, the premise of this argument cannot be accepted.
The partition cases are themselves responsible for these ques-
tionable modes of reasoning, because the cases do not rationalize
133. (1980).
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themselves. Despite this, however, the cases are rational; they re-
spond to realization analysis. Viewed in this light, the cases consti-
tute a fairly coherent body of judicial rules concerning partitions
and realization. Viewed as a judicial rule of nonrecognition, on the
other hand, the cases present quite a different perspective.
The question whether or not the Walz rule is a judicial rule of
nonrecognition has immediate practical concern. As a nonrecogni-
tion rule for marital dissolutions, the rule can be extended far be-
yond the limits within which the realization doctrine would confine
it. In marital divisions the rule can be held to grant amnesty from
taxability, even under those statutes which require recognition of
gain or loss without regard to realization. Moreover it will be held
to grant amnesty from taxability in cases where jointly owned
property is divided without regard to whether it was jointly accu-
mulated. On the other hand, as it evolves into a rule peculiar to
the marital division cases, its broader significance as a doctrine of
general application to partitions will be lost. Therefore, how the
rule is understood at the level of fundamental principle has much
practical significance to taxpayers who seek to predict the conse-
quences of transactions in these areas.
PART II
A. Synthesis of Nonrealization Rules
The second purpose of this article is to educe from the cases
principles governing the tax consequences of all partitions in kind.
If the decided cases are understood in terms of the realization doc-
trine, the partition cases have broader significance than their ori-
gins in a dissolution of marriage context might suggest. It must be
recalled, however, that the Tax Court has explained the marital
cases as judicial nonrecognition cases, a view which, if sustained,
limits these cases strictly to the divorce context.
The first principle educed from the partition cases is the limiting
effect of the realization rule. Nonrealization follows only from the
exchange of a vested undivided interest in the whole of some sin-
gular item of property for a separate, vested interest in the whole
of an aliquot portion. Two corollaries of this principle hold that
the severed interest must be carved out of a single unit of property
and that receipt of property from outside the common unit is not
covered by the rule.'"
134. See generally cases cited note 60 supra.
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Determining what constitutes a single, partible unit of property
involves questions of relativity. Fungible units such as shares of
stock possess the requisite singularity. 35 The aggregate of commu-
nity property,"' jointly acquired property in Oklahoma""7 and Col-
orado, 88 and jointly acquired property held in legal joint owner-
ship in other common law jurisdictions," 9 have been held to
possess the requisite singularity. The cases so holding have found
that a polychotomous aggregate was a single item of property.
They are peculiar to their own facts in most respects. Nevertheless,
the cases suggest a test for singularity, and they certainly could be
applied in the marital context outside of divorce and separation.
The cases dealing with partitions of polychotomous aggregates
find the syndetic factor in the way property is owned. The cases
seem to support the idea that if in legal effect a single unit of prop-
erty composed of divisible units has a legal unity and constitutes
the object of a single set of ownership rights, it probably has the
needed singularity. An example of how this principle might be ex-
tended is found in the division in kind of a tract of land. Where
one tract is divided, title to which is held in undivided shares, the
realization test should turn on the unity of title and not on the
similarity of the divided parcels, so that a tract composed of culti-
vated land and timber lands might be divided to give the timber
lands to one owner and the cultivated lands to the other. Walz and
its progeny, in fact, are the only support for the nontaxability of
this partition. This test will not go far toward lending certainty to
transactions; such is the rough nature of the judicial doctrine of
realization.
As between married persons, the realization doctrine implies
that no determinative effect attaches to the fact of divorce. Separa-
tion of jointly owned properties for estate planning purposes, for
example, might take the form of a nontaxable complex partition.
Obviously, no presumption of arm's length dealing and a resulting
equality of values would be available. 140
By analogy to Cofield and Pokusa, it may be possible to repli-
135. Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507.
136. See cases cited note 60 supra.
137. See cases cited note 64 supra.
138. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th
Cir. 1975).
139. See text accompanying notes 75-102 supra.
140. See, e.g., Wren v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290, 293 (1965).
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cate the polychotomous unit among unmarried persons.141 Cohabi-
tation cases offer a close analogy, but it is conceivable that other
relationships or associations could produce a pattern of behavior
similar to that of the Cofield spouses. The distinguishing elements
appear to be that joint industry and contributions have resulted in
the accumulation of an aggregate of jointly owned properties so
closely tied by a net of interlacing equities that it is impossible to
separate each party's interest in each asset. Such a case might arise
between parent and child or in other familial relations based on
mutual dealing in confidence and trust.
Apart from questions concerning partible singularity of property,
the realization doctrine requires that partitions in which boot,
owelty, or other extrinsic considerations are mixed into the ex-
changes will give rise to realized gain or loss to that extent. 142 This
rule was developed in the Walz line of cases, and has been the
subject of some confusion.
In the beginning, Walz made nontaxability appear to depend
upon equality of value, and appeared to condone the presence of
extrinsic consideration in the division because in Walz a substan-
tial promissory note was given by the husband to the wife. The
appearance was deceptive; since the issue in Walz concerned reali-
zation of loss by the husband, the note given by him to the wife
did not affect the outcome. For a time it was uncertain why the
partition had to be equal and why inequality resulted in gain to
the transferor of the greater value. In Davenport v. Commis-
sioner,"'4 for example, the Tax Court seemed to apply a subjective
test. Its decision turned on whether the parties intended to make a
division and not a sale.
In marital cases it is now clear, however, that gain results not
from inequality per se, but from receipt of extrinsic consideration
based on a presumption of sorts, arising from the husband's trans-
fer of the greater value, that satisfaction results in gain under Da-
vis.14 In the marital cases, a rule of convenience permits some
outside consideration, but the extent to which a disproportionate
division may be equalized by separate consideration without tax
141. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Bost & Kimball, Divorces in
Community Property States: Selected Tax Problems, in NEW YORK UNiMsrry THIRTY-
SEVENTH ANNUAL INsTrrTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION $ 35.03 (1979).
142. E.g., Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975).
143. 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 856 (1953).
144. See Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. Cf. Bost & Kimball, supra note 141, 35.02[2]
at 35-6 (no obligation under California law with respect to separate property).
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effect is not clear. In Revenue Ruling 76-83, an equalizing note for
$258 out of a total community of $300,000 was disregarded as "not
of sufficient magnitude to prevent the division from being approxi-
mately equal. '"1 4 In Carson v. Commissioner,"" 53.8% of the com-
munity property worth $185,275 was set apart to the wife. The
court held that the taxpayer had not overcome the administrative
determination that this was not substantially disproportionate,
hence there was no realization of a claimed capital loss by the
taxpayer.14 7
If cash is community property, the cases have recognized that it
may be allocated disproportionately in a complex partition without
realization." 8 The question has not surfaced in an entireties case,
but the rule ought to be the same in a properly decided case in-
volving jointly accumulated entireties property. Revenue Ruling
74-347 hints at trouble in this respect when it defines the jointly
owned property as that received by way of completed gift." 9 Ordi-
narily, a joint bank account gives each owner a unilateral right of
withdrawal so that deposits of separate funds to such accounts are
not completed gifts to the codepositor until a disproportionate
withdrawal occurs." 0 When jointly acquired property is partitioned
the presence of cash in the hotchpot may trigger realization unless
its jointly acquired status can be shown.
Assumption of debt is similar to the giving of cash."' In commu-
nity property cases, the rule appears to be that the assumption of
community debt is treated as the giving and receiving of commu-
nity cash. A community debt is not extrinsic consideration, but it
enters the balance of values."62 The analogy should govern when a
complex partition of jointly acquired property is involved, but
where cotenants other than married persons are partitioning prop-
erty, there may be no sufficient analogy to community debt.
B. Special Statutory Taxable Events
As defined by section 61(a)(3), gross income is limited by the
145. 1976-1 C.B. 213, 214.
146. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818 (1978).
147. Id. at 821.
148. E.g., Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975); Davenport v. Commissioner, 12
T.C.M. (CCH) 856 (1953).
149. 1974-2 C.B. 26. The ruling also defines jointly owned property as property pur-
chased with the earnings of both the husband and wife.
150. Id.
151. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
152. See generally Hjorth, supra note 7, at 246.
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requirement of realization, but elsewhere the Code provides that
dispositions give rise to recognized gain or loss without regard to
whether a realization occurs. 153 These statutes, which can be called
special statutory taxable events to distinguish them from the sec-
tion 61(a)(3) taxable event, are based on underlying policies not
influenced by realization. In general, the special statutory taxable
events require that a realized gain previously unrecognized,'" or a
tax benefit previously enjoyed, 5 5 be recouped when the property
with respect to which the deferred gain or benefit was enjoyed
later changes hands.
The question of how the nontaxable partition is affected by spe-
cial statutory taxable events has not been squarely decided.'" If
exchanges in partition are nontaxable if and only if the require-
ment of realization has not been satisfied, then such exchanges,
notwithstanding the partition cases, may constitute taxable events
in cases where realization is not a requirement. On the other hand,
if partitions incident to divorce are covered by a nonstatutory rule
of nonrecognition, then such partitions would be nontaxable with-
out regard to the requirement of realization. When the question
arises in a divorce context, the Carrieres approach to the rule of
nontaxability would permit the court to brush these statutes aside,
because the legislative policy of such a judicial rule of nonrecogni-
tion would dictate that the exception to taxability be complete.
Outside the context of divorce, however, or if the Carrieres ap-
proach is rejected, the taxonomy of realization requires a new dis-
tinction. Since the underpinning of the rule of nontaxability in the
"anamolous" dissolution cases is nonrealization, there is no basis in
the rule itself to avoid the special statutory taxable event, although
some arguments to the contrary can be considered.
Where the statute uses the term "disposition," it could be ar-
gued that the word does not have the same meaning as it has in
section 1001. Certainly it is possible that Congress could have used
the same term in different senses in different places in the Code,
but it is not likely that Congress ever has used the word disposi-
tion in any sense other than its broadest generic sense. The stat-
153. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 47(a)(1), 425(c), 453B(a), 454(b), 691(a)(2), 1245(a)(1), 1250(a)(1)(A),
1251(b)(5), 1252(a)(1), 1254(a)(1), 1255(a)(1).
154. E.g., I.R.C. § 453B(a) (disposition of installment obligations).
155. E.g., I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1) (disposition of "1245" depreciable property).
156. See Hjorth, supra note 7, at 263. But cf. Oliver v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH)
403, 429 (1949) (installment obligation was present but this issue apparently not
considered).
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utes in question reveal an intention to use the term in its broadest
sense, because specific exceptions are created for gifts or transfers
by inheritance and devise. 1
A second argument might assert that the "division" which occurs
in a partition is not a "disposition." In the language of the cases,
beginning with Walz, and including the first of the Collins cases, "
there is verbal support for this position, but the support is illusory.
The division argument is but another variation on the nonrecogni-
tion argument.
Although these arguments seem to offer no exception to taxabil-
ity where a special statutory taxable event occurs, it is possible
that the special statutory taxable event will admit of some particu-
lar exception that would cover a partition. The principal statutes
in question can be reviewed for the purpose of testing that
hypothesis.
Perhaps the most pervasive special statutory taxable event con-
cerns section 453 installment obligations. Section 453B(a)(2)
provides:
If an installment obligation is satisfied at other than its face value
or distributed, transmitted, sold, or otherwise disposed of, gain or
loss shall result to the extent of the difference between the basis
of the obligation and ... the fair market value of the obligation
at the time of distribution, transmission, or disposition . . .oth-
erwise than by sale or exchange.' "
Under the explicit terms of the statute, gain or loss results without
realization. Gifts, distributions from trusts and estates, and other
nonrealization events will trigger section 453B(a)(2). 60 Exceptions
are provided by the statute for transmission of the obligation at
death, in which case section 691(a) applies,1 61 and for corporate
liquidations and liquidating distributions, 62 but no statutory ex-
ception touches the partition transaction.
The regulations provide a general exception: "Where the Code
157. E.g., I.R.C. § 1245(b)(1), (2) (exceptions and limitations to § 1245(a)).
158. Collins v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 461, 472 (1966) ("a division of property between
coowners would not be a disposition by either").
159. I.R.C. § 453B(a)(2). This discussion reflects the provisions of the Installment Sales
Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, signed by the President on Oct. 14, 1980.
160. See Legg v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 164, 168-71 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 496 F.2d
1179 (9th Cir. 1974). See generally Emory, Disposition of Installment Obligations: Income
Deferral, "Thou Art Lost and Gone Forever," 54 IowA L. REV. 945 (1969).
161. I.R.C. § 453B(c).
162. I.R.C. § 453B(d).
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provides for exceptions to the recognition of gain or loss in the case
of certain dispositions, no gain or loss shall result under section
453 ... ."16 This exception cannot literally protect the partition
if partitions are viewed as nonrealization events and not as nonrec-
ognition events. Because this regulation appears to create a gratui-
tous exception not supported by section 453B(a), it might appear,
however, to invite similar administrative treatment for partitions.
Nevertheless, nonrecognition of gain by force of statute reflects the
judgment of Congress that reckoning of an item of gross income
should be deferred pursuant to specific rules concerning basis,
character, and timing. The regulation's general exception can be
supported, therefore, as an interpretation of the several nonrecog-
nition statutes, even if it cannot be supported as an interpretation
of section 453B(a). On that analysis, similar treatment of parti-
tions is no more merited than the nonstatutory rule of nonrecogni-
tion itself.
Partition of an installment obligation could take one of two
forms. If a single obligation is subjected to a simple partition, it is
not practically likely that a disposition will occur. Ordinarily, a
jointly owned installment obligation is an indivisible unit, a prom-
issory note payable to the order of two persons. If such a note pay-
able to husband and wife is simply converted from tenancy by the
entireties to tenancy in common,1 '" and placed for collection with
an agent (or left with one spouse as agent) who divides the pro-
ceeds, a disposition should not be found to have occurred. 165 On
the other hand, in a complex partition where one spouse endorses
his interest in a jointly payable note to the other spouse, there is
no question that a disposition occurs. When this case comes to ju-
dicial attention in the marital context, a strong likelihood exists
that a further exception will be created, but in other cases, section
453B(a)(2) most likely will be applied.
In the case of an item of income in respect of a decedent, a spe-
cial statutory taxable event is created by section 691(a)(2) which
provides that if a right to receive income in respect of a decedent is
"transferred" by the person to whom it passes at death, "there
shall be included in gross income the value of the amount of in-
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(c)(2) (1980). The regulations do not reflect the Installment
Sales Revision Act of 1980.
164. See Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507 (also holding that conversion from joint ten-
ancy with right of survivorship to tenancy in common is not a taxable event).
165. See Rev. Rul. 79-44, 1979-1 C.B. 265.
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come in respect of the decedent.""' "Transfer" includes a sale, ex-
change, or other disposition or satisfaction at other than face
value.' e7 The statute excludes transmission at death to the estate
of the decedent or transfer to a person, other than the obligor, pur-
suant to the right of the person to receive the amount by reason of
death. 68 The right to receive an item of income in respect of the
decedent includes, by virtue of section 691(a)(4), the deferred gain
in a section 453 installment obligation. The regulations interpret
section 691(a)(2) to create a taxable event in the case of a gift,6 9
and realization is not an element of the taxable event. The statute
does not provide an exception which touches the partitions.
Recapture of depreciation is covered by sections 1245 and 1250,
which create a special statutory taxable event in the case of the
disposition of a certain class of property defined in those statutes
as "Section 1245 property" and as "Section 1250 property" respec-
tively. Each statute provides for recognition of gain whenever the
property is "disposed of." A disposition in this case is a transfer. 70
Both recapture statutes clearly apply to nonrealization disposi-
tions. Neither statute includes any exception which would cover
the nonrealization exchange incident to partition. Both statutes
make exception for: gifts; transfer at death except as provided in
section 691; transactions involving a substituted basis under sec-
tions 332, 351, 361, 371(a), 374(a), 721, or 731; exchanges under
section 1031 and 1033; and transactions between a partner and a
partnership. 7 1 How the recapture provisions would apply to the
division of property is an entirely open question. The strict analy-
sis based on the realization doctrine is that the partition would be
a taxable disposition, but the propensity of the courts would be to
hold that the statutes do not apply. 72
166. I.R.C. § 691(a)(2).
167. Id. See generally C. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND, & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARS 157-62 (1970).
168. I.R.C. § 691(a)(2),(5).
169. Tress. Reg. § 1.691(a)-4(a) (1957).
170. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-1(a) (1965); 1.1250-1(a) (1971). See generally C. FERGUSON, J.
FREELAND, & R. STEPHENS, supra note 167, at 786-800.
171. I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(3), 1250(d)(3).
172. But see Note, supra note 66, at 1041: "Under the equal value rule no sale or ex-
change is deemed to occur. It is only a short jump to the conclusion that there is no disposi-
tion for purposes of the recapture rules." This analysis offers an instructive example of the
confusion created when "sale or exchange" is used to denote the § 61(a)(3) taxable event.
When the taxable event does not occur, despite a disposition, it is due to the absence of
realization. In that case, to say that no sale or exchange occurs, as courts often do, actually
is to overlook the exocentricity of the couplet. It is not correct to reason from the artificial
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Premature disposition of property with respect to which invest-
ment credit and other credits have been claimed by the taxpayer is
a special statutory taxable event under section 47(a)(1), which re-
quires the taxpayer to recoup his investment credit in part: "If
during any taxable year any property is disposed of, or otherwise
ceases to be section 38 property with respect to the taxpayer,
before the close of the useful life which was taken into account in
computing the credit. . . . 111 A case might arise where section 38
property enters into a complex partition in such manner that the
clear effect of the transaction is that the property ceases to be sec-
tion 38 property. This might occur, for example, if an automobile,
title to which is held in joint names, formerly used by the husband
in business, is transferred to the wife before the close of its useful
life and is used by her for personal transportation. There is no
avoiding the fact that the car ceases to be used in business, hence
ceases to be depreciable, 17 4 hence ceases to be section 38 property.
Such a special statutory event will not easily be overcome, even by
the judicial rule of nonrecognition.
Dispositions will be taxable events under the following statutes
all of which involve the operative word "disposition": sections
425(c), 454(b), 617(d), 1251, 1252, 1254, 1255.175 All of these special
statutory taxable events potentially affect a partition if it is viewed
strictly as a nonrealization transaction. None provide an exception
which would cover the partition. On the other hand, the partition
is protected from ostensible taxability under certain statutes which
purport to operate on dispositions but nevertheless apply only to
the realized gain. These are special characterization statutes and
include sections 955(c), 1232(c), and 1235(a).
In addition to the income taxable events created by special stat-
utory provisions, sections 6166A(h)(1)(A)(ii) and 6166(g)(1) use the
term "disposed of" to define contingencies upon the happening of
which the deferral of estate tax under that section is terminated. A
similar consequence of a disposition is created in section
2032A(c)(1) with respect to special valuation property used for
farming purposes or in a trade or business. Partitions conceivably
would trigger these statutes upon the analysis that they constitute
dispositions.
meaning of the term to its ordinary meaning.
173. I.R.C. § 47(a)(1).
174. I.R.C. § 167(a)(1).
175. See generally, C. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND, & R. STEPHENS, supra note 167, at 801-
07.
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C. Deferred Consequences of Partitions Wholly Without
Realization
When a partition is wholly within the rule of nontaxability, the
tax consequences are deferred. The partition resembles common
nontaxable exchanges in this respect but only in a general way, for
the precise rules differ significantly. 1 7
To illustrate the rules governing deferred tax consequences of a
simple partition, the example set forth above can be supplemented
by further assumptions. First, Adam acquires all of Blackacre for
the cash sum of $25,000. Subsequently, Adam, allocating his basis
ratably, sells an undivided one-half interest to Noble for $15,000.
More than one year later, Adam and Noble effect a partition of
Blackacre. Immediately prior to partition, Noble's adjusted basis
in his undivided interest is $15,000, and Adam's adjusted basis in
his undivided interest is $12,500.17 After partition, Noble's basis
in his separated 500-acre parcel will be $15,000; Adam's basis,
$12,500.178 As to holding period, a question arises concerning
whether section 1223(1) or 1223(2) applies.1 79 Are the taxpayers
substituting the basis of the transferred property, or are they car-
rying forward with a transferred basis? This issue determines
which holding period rule applies, and upon that question will de-
pend the holding period of noncapital assets. Literally, section
1223(1) is the governing provision. In no respect should basis be
deemed to have been determined by reference to the basis of the
"other person."
In a wholly nontaxable complex partition, different nuances
arise. To illustrate, assume that Adam and Noble in the initial ex-
ample are spouses, and their joint property is community property.
Incident to dissolution, Adam receives Blackacre. His basis will be
the basis of Blackacre to the community.5 " In this case, there is
nothing resembling a substituted basis, and the holding periods
would be tacked under section 1223(2), since the basis of Adam is
determined in part by reference to the basis of Noble.
Many cases will satisfy the nonrealization rule. If gain were real-
176. With respect to specific tax consequences of exchanges in partition, we now enter a
well covered area. See generally Bost & Kimball, supra note 141, at 35.02; Hjorth, note 7
supra; Schwartz, note 57 supra; Note, note 66 supra.
177. I.R.C. § 1012(a).
178. This result is not supported by any authority discovered. The question has not been
considered.
179. See Private Letter Ruling 8016050 (Jan. 23, 1980).
180. E.g., Beth Corp., 350 F. Supp. at 1191.
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ized in the partition, many also would satisfy a nonrecognition
rule. Substantial differences in tax treatment could follow. Assume
that the example is varied so that the properties involved are
Blackacre and Whiteacre, separate tracts each of which is held for
investment. The shared basis in Blackacre is $50,000, but the
shared basis of Whiteacre is $25,000, allocable equally to each own-
er. A complex partition gives Whiteacre to Adam and Blackacre to
Noble. If Adam and Noble are unmarried, gain is realized, but sec-
tion 1031(a) (assuming the parties satisfy the holding test)181
would apply, providing amnesty from recognition of the gain. The
net effect would be a basis to Adam of $37,500 in Whiteacre com-
puted as follows:
(1) Section 1012(a). As to the one-half
interest of Whiteacre with which Adam began,
his basis is the cost ................................. $12,500
(2) Section 1031(b). As to the one-half
interest in Whiteacre acquired in exchange
for Blackacre, Adam substitutes his former
basis in the property so exchanged .................... $25,000
Total $37,500
If, however, the nonrealization rule applies because the parties are
divorcing spouses in a community property state, the basis to
Adam will be $25,000 as he takes the transferred basis from the
marital unit. In general, basis stays with the taxpayer in a nonrec-
ognition exchange by virtue of explicit statutory provisions which
permit it to be substituted to the new property.182 In nonrealiza-
tion transfers, however, by virtue of statutory provisions, 188 and by
virtue of judicially developed gloss,"8 basis follows the property.
The differing treatment roughly reflects the difference between de-
ferring a tax consequence and ignoring it.
Certain statutory provisions attach special characteristics to
property which will continue through a disposition. Among these
provisions, sections 306(a) and 1244(a) are noteworthy. Their ap-
plication to the X Corp. stock in a simple or complex partition as
supposed in the initial example can be taken for a paradigm.
If X Corp. stock is "section 306 stock," the wholly nontaxable
181. See I.R.C. § 1031(a).
182. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1); 1031(b).
183. E.g., I.R.C. § 1015.
184. E.g., Beth Corp., 350 F. Supp. at 1190.
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partition, whether simple or complex, would not precipitate section
306(a). Although this section purports to operate by virtue of a sale
or other disposition, the effect of section 306(a) is only to charac-
terize the amount realized. 88 If no amount is realized, section
306(a) does not apply. The X Corp. stock would continue to be
section 306 stock in the hands of its transferee by application of
section 306(c)(1)(C), which provides that stock is section 306 stock
if it is: "[S]tock the basis of which (in the hands of the shareholder
selling or otherwise disposing of such stock) is determined by ref-
erence to the basis (in the hands of such shareholder or any other
person) of section 306 stock."'1 6 This statute would apply whether
basis is considered to be substituted or carried over.
If the X Corp. stock is section 1244 stock, it appears that the
transferee pursuant to a complex partition would lose the benefit
of section 1244 to the extent of the transferred portion. Section
1244(a) applies its special ordinary loss characterization "in the
case of an individual" with respect to "section 1244 stock issued to
such individual." The regulations issued pursuant to this section
take a narrow view of the meaning of the phrase "section 1244
stock issued to such individual," providing:
In order to claim a deduction under section 1244 the individual,
or the partnership, sustaining the loss, must have continuously
held the stock from the date of issuance .... An individual who
acquires stock from a shareholder by purchase, gift, devise, or in
any other manner is not entitled to an ordinary loss under section
1244 with respect to such stock.187
According to these regulations the partner of a partnership to
whom section 1244 stock is issued is not entitled to the section
1244 benefit if the stock is distributed by the partnership to the
partner. The reasonable view of this regulation as applied to the
complex partition should be that, at least to the extent of the un-
divided one-half interest originally inhering to the transferee, the
section 1244 status continues, but as to that undivided one-half
interest received from the other co-owner, section 1244 status is
lost. On the other hand, where a simple partition of stock which is
section 1244 stock prior to the partition occurs, the status of the
stock as section 1244 stock ought to continue with respect to each
185. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-1(b)(1) (1955).
186. I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(C).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(a)-1(b) (1960).
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of the co-owners after the partition. They continue to be, with re-
spect to their divided shares of the stock, the individuals to whom
the section 1244 stock was issued.
D. Immediate Consequences of Partial Realization of Gain
Incident to Partition
A partition may be taxable in part because extrinsic considera-
tion is given and received. In these cases it is necessary to deter-
mine the amount of gain realized and whether it will be recog-
nized.188 Measurement of gain involves questions unique to
partitions.
The partially taxable partition requires that section 1001 be ap-
plied. In simple partitions where the parties have a single or uni-
form basis, the procedure is uncomplicated. For example, if Adam
and Noble partition a 100-acre tract so that Adam receives 40
acres in kind plus boot of $10, the amount realized by Adam is $10.
The gain realized will be the excess of $10 over Adam's basis in the
proportion of the land exchanged for cash. In the simple case, that
basis would be determined simply by prorating so that 20% of
Adam's basis would offset the amount realized. In a complex parti-
tion, however, problems arise in identifying which basis measures
the gain. Two approaches are available.
Revenue Ruling 74-347 uses a blended basis approach.' Under
the facts of this ruling there was no evidence that particular assets
were treated distinctly, so it was not possible to determine whether
some assets were exchanged and others were sold. The ruling an-
nounces a general approach to computing the gain. The basis of
the husband in the excess jointly owned property received by the
wife was determined by the application of a formula which had the
effect of allocating the basis between the exchanged property and
the sold property in the proportion that the value of the excess
jointly owned property bore to the net fair market value of all
jointly owned property. 190 The fraction is as follows:1 91
188. See Bost & Kimball, supra note 141, at 35.02; Hjorth, note 7 supra; Schwartz,
note 57 supra; Note, note 66 supra.
189. 1974-2 C.B. 26.
190. See Hjorth, supra note 7, at 255.
191. 1974-2 C.B. at 27.
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Net fair market
value of excess
jointly-owned
property re-
Adjusted basis ceived by the Adjusted basis
of excess jointly- w i fe of all jointly-
owned property N X owned property
received by the Net fair market received by thewife value of all wifejointly-owned
property re-
ceived by the
wife
The adjusted basis of all the jointly owned property received by
the wife included personal property with a basis of $4,000 and a
net fair market value of $2,000. The basis of this property in the
hands of the wife was reduced to $2,000. The ruling states that the
adjusted basis of the jointly owned property received by the wife
does not include the portion of the adjusted basis of any jointly
owned asset which exceeds the net fair market value." 2 The basis
of the wife in the jointly owned property transferred to her would,
under Davis, be the fair market value of the taxable portion and
the transferred basis of the nontaxable portion.
The blended basis approach of Revenue Ruling 74-347 is not al-
ways applicable. It is required only when it is not possible to deter-
mine that particular assets were sold. In other cases, Carrieres
holds that where the taxpayer can show that a particular asset was
the subject of the taxable sale and purchase, gain will be realized
accordingly."9 Under Carrieres, taxpayers are allowed latitude for
tax planning, because assets with relatively less appreciation may
be allocated to the taxable portion of the transaction by agreement
between the parties."'
Since a partition always takes the form of an exchange, the po-
tential application of a nonrecognition provision to the realized
part of gain in a partially taxable partition must be considered. If a
polychotomous unit of property is divided unequally and if the re-
cipient of the greater portion of the joint property transfers sepa-
rate property to equalize the division, the separate property may
be eligible for nonrecognition treatment under section 1031 or sec-
192. Id.
193. 64 T.C. at 965-66.
194. Id.
19801
678 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:629
tion 1036. Applying the Carrieres selective basis approach, the tax-
payers may order the transaction so that the gain realized is not
recognized by virtue of a specific nonrecognition provision.
CONCLUSION
The partition cases present a jurisprudential anomaly. Over
many years, this body of cases has defined a class of exchanges
which are not subject to taxation. From the beginning, these cases
developed the rule with scant attention to its rationale under the
Code. Although that rationale may have been self-evident to the
Board of Tax Appeals when Walz was decided, courts and com-
mentators in more recent years have been unable to rationalize the
cases in statutory terms. Consequently, the rule of these cases
lately has been regarded as a judicially created exception to a clear,
statutory requirement of taxability justified solely by force of pre-
cedent. When so understood, the cases claim no legitimacy, create
an arbitrary tax policy, and cause endless problems for taxpayers
who, without guidance of the reason for the rule, must seek to pre-
dict tax consequences under circumstances analogous to those de-
cided by the cases.
On closer examination, however, it is clear that the division of
property between co-owners is a nontaxable event, regardless of
whether it is incident to a marital dissolution. The rationale for
this rule is found in the realization requirement which is part of
the judicial gloss on the statutory definition of gross income. It is
also apparent that the Board of Tax Appeals which decided Walz
viewed this realization doctrine as the self-evident rationale for its
result. Therefore, the marital partition cases should be understood
as having developed a branch of the realization doctrine. So under-
stood, these cases can be reconciled with the statute, and given re-
stored legitimacy. Moreover, by reference to their nonrealization
rationale, the marital partition nonrealization cases can afford rea-
sonably predictable results in many areas which become opened to
straightforward reasoning by legal analogy to the decided cases.
Thus, the "marital anomaly" cases elucidate a useful area of the
realization doctrine not otherwise developed in the law, because
they delve farther into the tax analysis of the partition exchanges
than any other body of authority has done.
Most writers who consider this area recommend a congressional
solution to the marital property division problem because of the
inappropriateness of the Davis tax as a matter of policy and be-
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cause of the inequity which exists under the cases.1" It is believed
that a statutory rule of nonrecognition in marital cases is needed
for these reasons and for the further reason that the courts, follow-
ing the suggestion in Carrieres, are certain to continue the effort to
develop judicial solutions in default of a congressional solution.
Such solutions are rough and arbitrary, because the courts are ill-
equipped to legislate.
On the other hand, it is not apparent that the subject of parti-
tions, as opposed to marital property divisions, ought to be covered
by statute. The existing provisions for nonrecognition of gain in
certain exchanges cover most partitions. The realization doctrine
should prove sufficient to develop solutions to marginal problems
presented by the most varied circumstances out of which partitions
might arise.
195. E.g., Hjorth, supra note 7, at 264-74 (suggesting partnership analogy by legislation);
Hull, supra note 57, at 36.10-11 (endorsing American Bar Association Family Law Section
proposal patterned after § 2516); Schwartz, supra note 57, at 199.
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